ACTU : La Chambre d’appel de la CPI confirme que la Jordanie a manqué à son devoir d’arrêter le président soudanais Omar Al-Bashir

Catherine MAIA

Le 6 mai 2019, à la suite de l'appel interjeté par la Jordanie, c’est à l’unanimité de ses 5 juges que la Chambre d'appel de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) a confirmé la décision de la Chambre préliminaire II quant à sa conclusion selon laquelle la Jordanie – État partie au Statut de Rome de la CPI depuis 2002 – a manqué à ses obligations internationales en n'arrêtant pas M. Omar Al-Bashir, alors président du Soudan, et en ne le remettant pas à la CPI, tandis qu’il se trouvait sur le territoire jordanien pour assister au Sommet de la Ligue des États arabes le 29 mars 2017.

Bien que le Soudan ne soit pas partie au Statut de Rome de la CPI, la situation du Darfour a été déférée à la CPI par le Conseil de sécurité dans sa Résolution 1593 du 31 mars 2005, à la suite de laquelle une enquête a été ouverte par le Procureur en juin 2005. Omar Al-Bashir, qui a été destitué le 11 avril 2019 après quatre mois de protestations massives à travers tout le Soudan, est visé par deux mandats d’arrêt émis par la CPI, respectivement en 2009 et 2010, pour génocide, crimes contre l’humanité et crimes de guerre supposément commis dans le cadre de la campagne contre-insurrectionnelle violente menée par Khartoum dans la région du Darfour entre 2003 et 2008.

Tout au long de sa présidence, Omar Al-Bashir est resté totalement indifférent aux mandats d’arrêts internationaux émis contre lui, n’hésitant pas à se rendre à plusieurs occasions à l’étranger, où il a été reçu par certains pays, membres et non membres de la CPI, tandis que d’autres ont formellement indiqué qu’il n’était pas le bienvenu sur leur territoire.

Avec ce contexte pour toile de fond, la décision de la Chambre d’appel de la CPI était d’autant plus attendue qu’elle touche à des questions cruciales de droit international public, dont le droit international coutumier et les effets des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité, sur lesquelles il n’y a pas nécessairement consensus. À cet égard, il est intéressant de relever l'aspect novateur du processus ayant conduit au jugement de la Chambre d’appel, celle-ci ayant reçu, à son invitation, des mémoires d’amici curiae de l'Union africaine, de la Ligue arabe et d'une douzaine de professeurs de droit qui, outre leurs observations écrites, ont été entendus et interrogés par la Chambre pendant plusieurs jours en septembre 2018.

C'est au terme de ce processus que, dans son arrêt du 6 mai 2019, la Chambre d'appel considère que l'article 27-2 du Statut de Rome de la CPI – lequel dispose que « [l]es immunités ou règles de procédure spéciales qui peuvent s’attacher à la qualité officielle d’une personne, en vertu du droit interne ou du droit international, n’empêchent pas la Cour d’exercer sa compétence à l’égard de cette personne » – reflète une norme de droit international coutumier. Autrement dit, il n'y a pas d'immunité des chefs d'État en droit international coutumier vis-à-vis d'un tribunal international compétent.

La Chambre d’appel en déduit que l'immunité des chefs d'État est également inapplicable sur un plan bilatéral entre, d’une part, la Jordanie, État partie au Statut de Rome et État membre de l’ONU, invitée à arrêter et à remettre M. Al-Bashir (chef de l'État du Soudan à l'époque des faits), et, d’autre part, le Soudan, État tiers au Statut de Rome mais État membre de l’ONU, soumis à une obligation de coopérer en vertu de la Résolution 1593 (2005) par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité décidait que « le Gouvernement soudanais et toutes les autres parties au conflit du Darfour doivent coopérer pleinement avec la Cour et le Procureur et leur apporter toute l’assistance nécessaire conformément à la présente résolution et, tout en reconnaissant que le Statut de Rome n’impose aucune obligation aux États qui n’y sont pas parties, demande instamment à tous les États et à toutes les organisations régionales et internationales concernées de coopérer pleinement » (§ 2). 

En ce sens, la Chambre d'appel affirme :

“There is neither State practice nor opinio juris that would support the existence of Head of State immunity under customary international law vis-à-vis an international court. To the contrary, such immunity has never been recognised in international law as a bar to the jurisdiction of an international court” (§ 1).

“The absence of a rule of customary international law recognising Head of State immunity vis-à-vis international courts is relevant not only to the question of whether an international court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a Head of State and conduct proceedings against him or her, but also for the horizontal relationship between States when a State is requested by an international court to arrest and surrender the Head of State of another State. No immunities under customary international law operate in such a situation to bar an international court in its exercise of its own jurisdiction” (§ 2). 

“Resolution 1593 gives the Court power to exercise its jurisdiction over the situation in Darfur, Sudan, which it must exercise ‘in accordance with [the] Statute’. This includes article 27(2), which provides that immunities are not a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction. As Sudan is obliged to ‘cooperate fully’ with the Court, the effect of article 27(2) arises also in the horizontal relationship – Sudan cannot invoke Head of State immunity if a State Party is requested to arrest and surrender Mr Al-Bashir. Therefore, there was no Head of State immunity that Sudan could invoke in relation to Jordan, had the latter arrested Mr Al-Bashir on the basis of an arrest warrant issued by the Court. Accordingly, there was also no immunity that Jordan would have been required to ‘disregard’ by executing the Court’s arrest warrant. And there was no need for a waiver by Sudan of Head of State immunity” (§ 7). 

Pour sa défense, la Jordanie a notamment invoqué les arguments suivants :

“Jordan contends that the resolution does not impose on States the obligation to ‘disregard’ Mr AlBashir’s immunity as ‘the resolution imposes no obligations on States other than Sudan’” (§ 66).

“With respect to jus cogens norms, Jordan submits that based on the Arrest Warrant Case and the ICJ case of Germany v. Italy, the prohibitions of genocide and crimes against humanity may be considered as such norms; however the status of these prohibitions ‘does not affect the immunities that operate to protect State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction’.162 Jordan adds that the ‘question of hierarchy of norms doesn’t arise in this situation because the rules in question address quite different issues and are not in conflict’.163 In that regard, it avers that when Jordan ‘recognized the immunity of Mr Al-Bashir, it is not committing an act of genocide [,…] crimes against humanity [or…] transgressing a peremptory norm of international law’” (§ 67).

Parmi les amici curiae, l’UA a notamment insisté sur la position du Soudan comme État tiers au Statut de Rome :

“The African Union also submits that Resolution 1593 does not waive the immunity of Mr Al-Bashir and a referral under article 13(b) of the Statute does not place a State that is not a party to it in a situation analogous to that of a State Party” (§ 82).

À l'inverse, d'autres ont émis des positions favorables au raisonnement de la CPI :

“Ms Lattanzi submits that article 27 represents a treaty derogation to the immunities enjoyed by Heads of State which binds (i) States Parties; (ii) States that accepted ad hoc the Court’s jurisdiction; and (iii) non-party States referred by the UN Security Council. She submits that article 27 applies to the horizontal relationship between Jordan and Sudan and that article 98(1) is simply irrelevant in the present situation” (§ 88). 

“Mr Robinson et al. contend that the interpretation of the Pre-Trial Chamber is the most convincing reconciliation of the relevant provisions of the Statute namely, articles 27, 86 and 98, with customary international law, and Resolution 1593” (§ 92).

De son côté, la Procureure de la CPI a considéré que la Chambre préliminaire avait correctement interprété que la qualité officielle de M. Al-Bashir est sans pertinence aux fins du Statut :

“The Prosecutor argues that the ‘two inter-dependent obligations’, i.e. the ‘vertical effect’ and the ‘horizontal effect’, are indivisible and constitute the ‘only possible reading’ of article 27 that is consistent with the applicable principles of interpretation under the Vienna Convention. With respect to the vertical effect, the Prosecutor avers that while article 27 concerns the relations between the Court and a State Party, it also ‘exceptionally’ governs relations between the Court and a non-State Party ‘if the latter is a [UN Security Council] Situation-Referral State’. The Prosecutor argues that, by virtue of article 27, the official capacity of a suspect or an accused ‘cannot bar judicial proceedings before the Court’; a State Party or a UN Security Council Situation-Referral State can neither ‘claim immunity vis-à-vis the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, nor validly object to any request addressed to it for arrest and surrender of its official’” (§ 69). 

“The Prosecutor further submits that the horizontal effect is the ‘necessary corollary’ of its vertical effect in that States Parties must mutually respect that ‘the other is likewise bound ‘vertically’ by article 27. Referring to the plain terms of article 27 and State practice, the Prosecutor avers that the ‘direct implications’ of these effects are two-fold: (i) there is no conflicting obligation and therefore ‘Jordan was obliged to respect the vertical effect of article 27’; and (ii) Jordan could not rely on article 98(1) as a basis to not cooperate with the Court. According to the Prosecutor, Jordan’s interpretation of article 27 in opposition to article 98 and the assumption that Sudan cannot be the subject of any obligations under the Statute are incorrect ‘premises’” (§ 70).

Pour fonder sa décision, la Chambre d'appel a apporté d’importantes précisions dans de longs développements, insistant tout particulièrement sur le fait que l'immunité attachée à la position de chef d'État ne vaut que dans les relations bilatérales entre Etats. 

“The most direct effect of article 27(2) of the Statute is that a Head of State cannot claim Head of State immunity when he or she appears before the ICC for prosecution in accordance with the provisions on the exercise of jurisdiction under articles 12 et seq. of the Statute. Nor does Head of State immunity present a bar to the Court opening an investigation in relation to or issuing a warrant of arrest against a Head of State. This was specifically recognised by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant Case” (§ 102). 

“It is of note that article 27(2) of the Statute is a clear provision in conventional law; but it also reflects the status of customary international law. In this regard, the Appeals Chamber notes, first, article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which provides as follows: The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment (§ 103). 

“On 11 December 1946, the UN General Assembly expressly affirmed the ‘principles of international law recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal’ and directed the newly established International Law Commission to ‘treat as a matter of primary importance plans for the formulation […] of the principles recognized’ therein. The International Law Commission subsequently formulated the Nuremberg Principles, Principle III of which reads as follows: ‘The fact that a person who committed an act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law’” (§ 104). 

“The same principle was included in article 3 of the International Law Commission’s draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind.311 The Convention against Genocide contains a similar provision, providing in its article IV: Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals. [Emphasis added]” (§ 105). 

“There is no suggestion in any of these instruments that immunity of Heads of State could stand in the way of their prosecution before an international court for international crimes” (§ 106). 

“Further milestones in this regard were the Statutes of the international criminal tribunals – the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [the ‘ICTY’ and the ‘ICTR’] – which the UN Security Council adopted in 1993 and 1994, respectively. Both Statutes include provisions similar to Principle III of the Nuremberg Principles. In his reports on the draft Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, the UN SecretaryGeneral indicated that they should contain provisions ‘which specify that a plea of head of State immunity […] will not constitute a defence, nor will it mitigate punishment’. It is of note that the ICTY issued an indictment against President Slobodan Milošević on 22 May 1999, while he was still President of Serbia” (§ 107). 

“The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone [the ‘SCSL’], a court established pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution by an agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the UN Secretary-General, also contains a provision rejecting the suggestion that Head of State immunity could be invoked against the SCSL’s exercise of jurisdiction. Article 6(2) of the SCSL Statute315 stipulates: The official position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment” (§ 108). 

“The SCSL confirmed an indictment against Mr Charles Taylor on 7 March 2003 and issued a warrant for his arrest, while he was still President of Liberia. Mr Taylor filed an application before the SCSL, requesting that the court quash the indictment and set aside the arrest warrant on the ground that he was immune from the SCSL’s jurisdiction. A panel of the SCSL’s Appeals Chamber heard this application, noting that it was called upon to decide ‘whether it was lawful for the Special Court to issue an indictment and to circulate an arrest warrant in respect of a serving Head of State’. It answered this question in the affirmative, noting, first, that the SCSL was an international court, and, second, relying, inter alia, on the ICJ’s finding in the Arrest Warrant Case, that Head of State immunity did not find application before international courts. It found that ‘the principle seems now established that the sovereign equality of states does not prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted before an international criminal tribunal or state’” (§ 109). 

“Turning to the jurisprudence of the ICC, the Appeals Chamber recalls that Pre-Trial Chamber I, in the ‘Corrigendum to the Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’ [the ‘Malawi Decision’], reached the same conclusion in a situation that was identical to the case at hand: a State Party to the Rome Statute having failed to execute a request for the arrest and surrender of Mr Al- Bashir” (§ 110).

“The absence of a rule of customary international law recognising Head of State immunity vis-à-vis international courts is relevant not only to the question of whether an international court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a Head of State and conduct proceedings against him or her, but also for the horizontal relationship between States when a State is requested by an international court to arrest and surrender the Head of State of another State” (§ 114).

“The Appeals Chamber considers that the absence of a rule of customary international law recognising Head of State immunity vis-à-vis an international court is also explained by the different character of international courts when compared with domestic jurisdictions. While the latter are essentially an expression of a State’s sovereign power, which is necessarily limited by the sovereign power of the other States, the former, when adjudicating international crimes, do not act on behalf of a particular State or States. Rather, international courts act on behalf of the international community as a whole” (§ 115).

Au regard les circonstances particulières de cette affaire déférée par le Conseil de sécurité, la Chambre d'appel a toutefois décidé, à la majorité, d'annuler la décision de la Chambre préliminaire de référer la non-coopération de la Jordanie à l'Assemblée des États Parties (AEP) et au Conseil de sécurité. Sur ce point, la Chambre d'appel a considéré que la Chambre préliminaire avait utilisé à tort son pouvoir discrétionnaire en référant la non-coopération de la Jordanie à l'AEP et au Conseil de sécurité, sur la base d'une conclusion erronée selon laquelle la Jordanie n'avait pas demandé la tenue de consultations avec la Cour.

“The first clause of article 87(7) of the Statute consists of two cumulative conditions, namely, (i) that the State concerned failed to comply with a request to cooperate; and (ii) that this non-compliance is grave enough to prevent the Court from exercising its functions and powers under the Statute. It is only when the Chamber has established that both conditions are met that it may proceed to consider whether to refer the State to the Assembly of States Parties or the UN Security Council or both, following a finding of non-compliance” (§ 8).

Cette importante décision de la Cour d'appel de la CPI n'est pas exempte de zones d’ombre. On peut notamment se demander quelle est la définition d’un tribunal international agissant au nom de la communauté internationale, comment se fera l’articulation avec le Protocole de Malabo qui prévoit explicitement l’immunité des chefs d’État dans le mandat de la future Cour africaine de justice et des droits de l'homme (CAJDH), ou encore si la solution de la Chambre d’appel aurait été la même si la Jordanie avait été un État non partie au Statut de Rome. Afin d'éclairer ces zones d’ombre, il est probable que l’Union africaine demandera à l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies de saisir la Cour internationale de Justice afin d'obtenir un avis consultatif sur la question des immunités chefs d'État et des responsables gouvernementaux en droit international.