The fall of the Gaddafi regime had resulted in an influx of Tuareg fighters who had served in the Libyan army bringing with them large amounts of weapons looted from government stockpiles. This resulted in the rebellion gaining swift momentum against the weak and poorly equipped Malian military security forces and soon saw much of the north of the country fall into rebel hands. These events also resulted in the overthrow of President Amadou Toumani Toure in a military coup on 22 March 2012.

While this rebellion has been watched with concern by the international community, including the West Africa region, it is in fact the presence and growing influence of Islamist and jihadist groups inside northern Mali that is receiving greater international attention. These groups - Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Dine and Boko Haram elements – have continued to consolidate their control over the towns and territory of northern Mali often at the expense of the more secular MNLA. This has also led to concern that these groups will pose not only a threat to Mali but also to other countries throughout West and North Africa. In particular it is the fear that northern Mali may become a base from which terrorist attacks and even local insurgencies may be organised and supported.

As these threats are increasingly being discussed it is worthwhile taking an opportunity to discuss some aspects that deserve particular attention.

Increasingly Multinational Recruitment
 On issue of significant concern is the increasing recruitment and hosting of foreign fighters by jihadist groups which have established themselves in northern Mali. Among these fighters are many recruits from other West African countries. One such fighter, an Ivorian quoted in an AFP report dated 18 July 2012 as saying, "We are many Africans, come from all over to join the mujahideen in Gao."

The wide ranging nature of this recruitment of fighters from across the region was also expressed in this report by the leader of the MUJAO in the town of Gao, Bilal Hicham, who said, “Here there are Malians, Somalis, Ivorians, Senegalese, Ghanaians, Gambians, Mauritanians, Algerians, Guineans, Nigerians, all the Muslims here." Other militants interviewed claimed that over 200 African recruits with an average age of sixteen were now undergoing military and religious training in two MUJWA camps. In addition to these fighters there are also reports of other fighters from the Maghreb arriving in the region and even of the presence of Pakistanis and Afghans.

While General Carter Ham, the Commander of the US military’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) estimated in late July 2012 the number of foreign fighters as in the "dozens and perhaps in the low hundreds," reliable figures are difficult to confirm. Some French Officials, including the Foreign Affairs Minister, Laurent Fabius, recently estimated the number of Islamists present in northern Mali to be in the thousands. This second and much higher estimate would represent a jihadist presence that is far from the few hundred originally estimated to have composed the Sahelian katiba of AQIM.

Growing links between groups in the Sahel region
 Another important concern is the increasing willingness and ability of these groups to link and work together across Africa, particularly in West Africa. AQIM appeared to be the architect of a developing alliance or network of jihadist groups involving itself, the MUJAO and the Nigerian-based Boko Haram. These linkages have already allowed these groups to share some knowledge regarding the use of weapons, explosives and kidnapping as well as funds and even combatants among between each of these groups.

The significant role that this cooperation has already played within West Africa was clearly demonstrated by the assistance given to Boko Haram by AQIM following the crackdown on the group by Nigerian security forces in 2009. This confrontation resulted in the death of hundreds of the fundamentalist group’s members, including its founder leader Mohammed Yusuf. It was the assistance that followed from AQIM at this critical time that allowed the group to recover from these losses and continue its campaign of violence and terrorism inside Nigeria.

The AQIM’s assistance has also had more wide reaching implications for the region with the Nigerian group increasing its ties with other jihadist groups in West Africa and the Sahel region. This more regional outlook has been most visibly demonstrated through the media reports of the presence in northern Mali of hundreds of Boko Haram members now present and fighting alongside jihadist groups in the area.

This inter-group cooperation while certainly aided by commonly held religious beliefs and ideological orientations, namely Salafi-Jihai, and their desire to impose their own interpretations of Islamic law on areas under their individual control and influence, is also facilitated by a variety of local factors that contribute to the creation of favorable conditions, including porous borders, weak opposing military and security forces as well as weak cooperation between the regional States concerned.

Following the collapse or retreat of government security forces in northern Mali, these groups have taken the opportunity to begin implementing their own interpretation of Islamic law. This has involved the introduction of hudud punishments that have resulted in a number of sentences being carried out including the stoning of a couple accused of adultery in the town of Aguelhok, the cutting-off of the hand of a thief in Ansongo as well as the whipping of unmarried couples, smokers and drinkers. The region has also witnessed the destruction of graves and shrines to Muslim saints which are considered idolatrous and un-Islamic by Islamists.

While fears of the emergence of a new Taliban-style state or territory that may threaten the peace and security of the wider region are certainly not farfetched, the steps necessary to avoid such an outcome are not so clear.

The difficulties in responding to the situation in northern Mali become somewhat clearer when we consider the risks associated with the proposal for a military intervention organised by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Risks of a military intervention in northern Mali
It is important to first note that the intention here is not to advocate any form of inaction; rather it is to emphasise some of the risks inherent in any military operations against jihadist groups who may seek opportunities to justify and fuel their own violent ideological agenda.

Without looking into a number of key issues, relating, among other things, to how any intervention by an ECOWAS force may be well designed and conducted, the overall strategic framework within which it will take place, its objectives, the nature of the confrontation that will result and finally how it will evolve (highly mobile warfare, urban guerilla, traditional warfare, etc.), that campaign is likely to act as a stone thrown at a swarm of bees, further accentuating the spread of the terrorist threat.

In this regard AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine have already issued explicit warnings to countries intending to participate in any ECOWAS intervention force as well as any country that would offer its support and assistance; expressing their intention to both fight them in Mali and to retaliate with terrorist attacks. The MUJAO’s leader in Gao, Bilal Hicham, has in that regard threatened to extend the jihad across West Africa, including by planting bombs in other countries "if necessary".

The exportation of the jihad to other countries is a real risk West Africa is likely to experience in the months and years ahead; new recruits from countries of the sub-region, who have undergone weapons training and religious radicalisation in northern Mali, given their familiarity with their own national environments and the possibility for them to operate from inside, could be dangerous vectors, allowing these groups to either build or strengthen already jihadist network or embryonic presence or even just to launch waves of retaliatory attacks within their countries of origin.

In addition to this threat is also the danger that any ECOWAS intervention force may also become mired in an extended and costly counter-insurgency campaign across not only an area in northern Mali roughly the size of France but also possibly into the neighbouring countries, notably Niger, Mauritania and Algeria. In addition this is the risk that any prolonged military campaign may also serve to mobilise new recruits and support from within the international jihadist community for any insurgency. While any inflow of foreign fighters might result in additional technical expertise (weapons, explosives etc.) and new sources of funding to jihadist groups, it is also likely that they would also contribute to a further religious radicalisation of the insurgency and make a negotiated peaceful settlement more difficult to achieve.

With both the security situation in Mali and the regional threat posed by jihadist groups now based in the north of the country completely beyond the control of the Malian government and its security forces an increase of cooperation between countries in the region is more than ever essential. While individual countries can take steps to increase their own intelligence capabilities, especially to monitor the threat from radical Islamists within their own communities, other issues such as effective control over borders and smuggling will require further efforts at national levels to improve borders security capabilities and cooperation at the regional level.

By taking steps to address these issues the countries of the region would move towards cutting off vital sources of men, money and supplies to jihadist groups in northern Mali, as well as reduce their ability to redeploy these resources into other regions. If successful these efforts would seriously undermine the ability of jihadist groups to either respond or seek refuge from military offensives and other security operations that may be mounted against them. However, should these issues continue to go unresolved it is likely that any military intervention in northern Mali may actually lead to further violence and instability both in Mali and the wider region.