The General Assembly voted today (29 November 2012) to grant Palestine non-member observer State status at the United Nations, while expressing the urgent need for the resumption of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians leading to a permanent two-State solution.
The resolution on the status of Palestine in the UN was adopted by a vote of 138 in favour to 9 against with 41 abstentions by the 193-member Assembly.
“We did not come here seeking to delegitimize a State established years ago, and that is Israel; rather we came to affirm the legitimacy of the State that must now achieve its independence, and that is Palestine,” the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmoud Abbas, told the Assembly before the vote.
Mr. Abbas noted that the world was being asked today to undertake a significant step in the process of rectifying the “unprecedented historical injustice” inflicted on the Palestinian people since 1948.
“Your support for our endeavour today,” he said, “will send a promising message – to millions of Palestinians on the land of Palestine, in the refugee camps both in the homeland and the Diaspora, and to the prisoners struggling for freedom in Israel’s prisons – that justice is possible and that there is a reason to be hopeful and that the peoples of the world do not accept the continuation of the occupation.”
Israel’s Ambassador to the UN, Ron Prosor, said his delegation could not accept today’s resolution. “Because this resolution is so one-sided, it doesn’t advance peace, it pushes it backwards,” he stated, adding that peace could only be achieved through negotiations.
“There’s only one route to Palestinian statehood and that route does not run through this chamber in New York. That route runs through direct negotiations between Jerusalem and Ramallah that will lead to a secure and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians,” he added. “There are no shortcuts. No quick fixes. No instant solutions.”
The Israelis and Palestinians have yet to resume direct negotiations since talks stalled in September 2010, after Israel refused to extend its freeze on settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territory.
“Today’s vote underscores the urgency of a resumption of meaningful negotiations,” Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said after the vote was finalized. “We must give new impetus to our collective efforts to ensure that an independent, sovereign, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine lives side by side with a secure State of Israel. I urge the parties to renew their commitment to a negotiated peace.”
Addressing the same gathering, the President of the General Assembly, Vuk Jeremic, appealed to “my dear friends from Palestine and Israel” to work for peace, to negotiate in good faith, and ultimately, to succeed in reaching the historical settlement.
“I have no doubt that history will judge this day to have been fraught with significance – but whether it will come to be looked upon as a step in the right direction on the road to peace will depend on how we bear ourselves in its wake,” he said. “Let us therefore have the wisdom to act in furtherance of the goal I’m sure we all share.”
In the resolution, the Assembly also voiced the hope that the Security Council will “consider favourably” the application submitted in September 2011 by Palestine for full UN membership.
The Palestinian bid for full UN membership stalled last year when the 15-nation Council, which decides whether or not to recommend admission by the Assembly, said it had been “unable to make a unanimous recommendation.”
Today’s action comes on the same day that the UN observed the annual International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People. Established in 1977, the Day marks the date in 1947 when the Assembly adopted a resolution partitioning then-mandated Palestine into two States, one Jewish and one Arab.
Source : ONU
A LIRE :
- John CERONE, « Legal Implications of the UN General Assembly Vote to Accord Palestine the Status of Observer State », ASIL Insights, 2012, volume 16, issue 37
-
Philippe WECKEL, « La Résolution 67/19 du 29 novembre
2012, l'acte de naissance de la Palestine ? », Sentinelle,
2 décembre 2012, n°326
John
CERONE, « Legal Implications of the UN General Assembly Vote to Accord
Palestine the Status of Observer State », ASIL
Insights, 2012, volume 16, issue 37
Introduction
[3] The term “non-Member State observer” seems to have caused a degree of confusion. The prefix “non” modifies only “Member,” and does not refer to all observers that are not Member States (which would of course be redundant in any event). It is perhaps for that reason that the General Assembly was careful to formulate the designation for Palestine as “non-member observer State”.
[4] The Montevideo criteria, described in the previous Insight and set forth in the 1933 Montevideo Convention, are now widely accepted as the definitive criteria for the establishment of statehood. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 U.N.T.S. 21, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a 40.html; see also Stephen McCaffrey, Dinah Shelton & John Cerone, Public International Law: Cases, Problems, & Texts 439 (2010). The United States referred to the Montevideo criteria in asserting the statehood of Kosovo at a time when fewer than sixty states had recognized Kosovo. See Written Statement of the United States of America Concerning the Request of the UN General Assembly for an Advisory Opinion on the Question of the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15640.pdf. For one U.S. court’s assessment of whether Palestine satisfied the Montevideo criteria as of 2004, see Knox v. PLO, 306 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
[5] In order for a new state to come into existence, it must meet the so-called Montevideo criteria: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) a government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.
[6] For example, collective non-recognition could effectively prevent fulfillment of the fourth Montevideo criterion. Collective recognition, on the other hand, reflects an authoritative opinion that the criteria have been met, even if, from a more “scientific” perspective, there might appear to be a shortfall.
[7] While it cannot be a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) without Security Council approval, it may be able to access the ICJ under Article 35(2) of its Statute and pursuant to Security Council Resolution 9 (1946), which allows states not parties to the ICJ Statute to file a declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction. Israel has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Nonetheless, many multilateral treaties contain compromissory clauses, conferring jurisdiction on the ICJ for disputes arising under those treaties. While Israel is a party to several such treaties, it frequently enters reservations to the compromissory clauses. Israel did not enter reservations to the Genocide Convention or the Convention on the Political Rights of Women. However, those treaties do not use the all “states formula.” Accession to those treaties is open only to UN Member States and other states invited by the General Assembly to accede, which would not include Palestine at this time.
[8] Palestine’s membership application received 107 “yes” votes at the UNESCO General Conference. Even though there were 185 UNESCO Member States entitled to vote, the 107 “yes” votes were sufficient to meet the 2/3 bar for membership, since the 2/3 calculation is based on UNESCO Member States present and voting. (Of the 173 Member States present, fifty-two states abstained, meaning that Palestine only needed eighty-one “yes” votes to be admitted.) Overall, Palestine’s membership bid attracted the supporting votes of approximately 58% of the total UNESCO membership. See Introductory Note to the Admission of Palestine into the United Nations, 51 I.L.M. 606 (2012).
[9] Indeed, until 2004, Palestine enjoyed greater rights of participation in the General Assembly than did the Holy See, which has had the status Observer State since 1964.
[10] The legal significance of the General Assembly vote can be assessed strictly within the framework of the United Nations Charter, where it has its most immediate impact, and it can also be assessed in the broader context of international law. Assessing the resolution’s legal value in this broader context requires an examination of both its content and the conditions of its adoption.
[11] Satisfying even the 2/3 bar were this issue to be regarded as an "important question." "Important questions" must be decided by the General Assembly "by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting." See U.N. Charter ch. IV, art. 18.
[12] The latter four states are former Trust Territories of, or have been in association with, the United States and tend to support its positions in the UN.
[13] In addition, a handful of states, including some that had voted in favor of the resolution, asserted that their vote should not be construed as recognition of the state of Palestine. See, e.g., the statement of the New Zealand delegation that “the question of recognition of a Palestinian State was a separate issue.” Press Release, General Assambly, General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine “Non-Member Observer State” Status in United Nations, U.N. Press Release GA/11317 (Nov. 29, 2012), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/ga11317.doc.htm.
[14] Speaking before the vote Israel’s representative asserted that the “Palestinian Authority . . . clearly fails to meet the criteria for statehood.”
[15] Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Jan. 21, 2009) (submitted on behalf of the Palestinian National Authority), available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/74EEE201-0FED-4481-95D4-
C8071087102C/279777/20090122PalestinianDeclaration2.pdf.
[16] The ICC has jurisdiction only to prosecute individuals and has no authority to bring proceedings against a state. It would be able to exercise jurisdiction over all international crimes committed in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as over all international crimes committed by Palestinian nationals anywhere.
[17] Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Ct. to the UN General Assembly, § 81, A/65/313 (Aug. 19, 2010).
[18] It might also include the question of the territorial scope of Palestine, and whether the Palestinian Authority is legally competent to represent Palestine in the international legal system or whether its authority extends to Gaza.
[19] Contrary to some reports, the OTP did not state that it was rejecting Palestine’s declaration of consent or that it lacked jurisdiction to proceed.
[20] Int’l Crim. Ct. Office of the Prosecutor, Statement: Situation in Palestine (Apr. 3, 2012), available at http://www.icc cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf [hereinafter Situation in Palestine].
[21] Id. § 7. Presumably they meant “observer entity”.
[22] See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] art. 305, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
[23] See Situation in Palestine, supra note 20, n.3.
[24] See Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties. However, the Summary of Practice also includes reference to the so-called “Vienna formula.” The “Vienna formula” is drawn from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to Article 81 of that instrument, “[t]he present Convention shall be open for signature by all States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency or parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to the Convention . . . .” The Summary of Practice seems to indicate that the Secretary-General will only seek the guidance of the General Assembly where a purported state does not fall within this formula (i.e., that a treaty open to participation by “all states” will presumably be open to any purported state that falls within the Vienna formula). Following its admission into UNESCO, a specialized agency of the United Nations, Palestine arguably falls within the Vienna formula. Introductory Note to the Admission of Palestine into the United Nations, supra note 8; see also Larry D. Johnson, Palestine's Admission to UNESCO: Consequences Within the UN?, 40 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 1-3, 118 (2012).
[25] “In interpreting and applying article 12 of the Rome Statute, the Office has assessed that it is for the relevant bodies at the United Nations or the Assembly of States Parties to make the legal determination whether Palestine qualifies as a State for the purpose of acceding to the Rome Statute and thereby enabling the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court under article 12(1). The Rome Statute provides no authority for the Office of the Prosecutor to adopt a method to define the term ‘State’ under article 12(3) which would be at variance with that established for the purpose of article 12(1).”
[26] In September 2012, the ICC Prosecutor suggested that the OTP would re-visit its assessment if the General Assembly were to act on the matter. See “The International Criminal Court: A New Approach to International Relations,” Speaker Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Sept. 21, 2012, Council on Foreign Relations (“But what we have also done is to leave the door open and to say that if this -- if Palestine is able to pass over that hurdle, of course, under the General Assembly, then we will revisit what the ICC can do.”).
[27] Underlying the issue of whether it is appropriate for the OTP to analogize to the practice of the Secretary General as treaty depositary is the more theoretical question of whether the OTP is more of a political organ or a judicial organ. The role of prosecutors in this respect varies significantly among states.
[28] See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 11(2), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
Introduction
On
November 29, 2012, the United Nations General Assembly voted to accord
Palestine the status of Non Member State observer.[1]
As a formal matter, Palestine’s designation has changed from that
of an observer “entity” to that of an observer “state.” In
terms of Palestine’s rights of participation in the General Assembly, the
resolution changes little. The significance of the resolution lies in its broader
impact on the question of Palestinian statehood in international law.
This Insight provides follow-up to the 2011 Insight by examining the significance of the vote in the context of the United Nations as it affects the broader issue of statehood. It concludes with a discussion of implications for possible investigation and prosecution by the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).
Statehood, UN Membership & Observer Status
This Insight provides follow-up to the 2011 Insight by examining the significance of the vote in the context of the United Nations as it affects the broader issue of statehood. It concludes with a discussion of implications for possible investigation and prosecution by the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).
Statehood, UN Membership & Observer Status
As
described in the 2011 Insight, the issues of statehood and UN Membership
are distinct. UN Membership is regulated by the UN Charter in conjunction with
the practice of the Organization and its Members. Palestine has never been a
Member State of the UN.
However, apart from Membership in the Organization, the UN provides for other forms of participation in its activities. Although not provided for in the Charter, the UN has developed a practice of admitting states and certain other entities and organizations to observer status.[2] Observers have various rights of participation in UN deliberations, but may not vote. Until November 29, 2012, Palestine had the status of an observer “entity.” It now has the status of observer state, or in the words of the UN Protocol Office, “Non-member States having received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly and maintaining permanent observer missions at Headquarters.”[3]
The issue of statehood is regulated by general international law. Recognition of statehood[4] by other states is generally not required for a state to come into being. However, collective recognition or non-recognition by an overwhelming majority of states may influence the question of the existence of a state by influencing the application and appreciation of the Montevideo criteria.[5] Collective recognition could perfect an otherwise imperfect fulfillment of the criteria, and, alternatively, collective non-recognition could effectively prevent the fulfillment of the criteria.[6]
If Palestine is a state, then it is entitled to all of the rights and subject to all of the duties of states under international law. These rights include immunities of the state and its officials, protection from the use of force by other states, the right of self-defense and collective selfdefense in the event of an armed attack against it, plenary jurisdiction over its territory, the prohibition of intervention in matters essentially within its domestic jurisdiction, the possibility of membership in other intergovernmental organizations and specialized agencies, and full treaty making capacity. Statehood could also provide access to international courts and other dispute settlement mechanisms, including the International Court of Justice.[7]
The General Assembly Vote
However, apart from Membership in the Organization, the UN provides for other forms of participation in its activities. Although not provided for in the Charter, the UN has developed a practice of admitting states and certain other entities and organizations to observer status.[2] Observers have various rights of participation in UN deliberations, but may not vote. Until November 29, 2012, Palestine had the status of an observer “entity.” It now has the status of observer state, or in the words of the UN Protocol Office, “Non-member States having received a standing invitation to participate as observers in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly and maintaining permanent observer missions at Headquarters.”[3]
The issue of statehood is regulated by general international law. Recognition of statehood[4] by other states is generally not required for a state to come into being. However, collective recognition or non-recognition by an overwhelming majority of states may influence the question of the existence of a state by influencing the application and appreciation of the Montevideo criteria.[5] Collective recognition could perfect an otherwise imperfect fulfillment of the criteria, and, alternatively, collective non-recognition could effectively prevent the fulfillment of the criteria.[6]
If Palestine is a state, then it is entitled to all of the rights and subject to all of the duties of states under international law. These rights include immunities of the state and its officials, protection from the use of force by other states, the right of self-defense and collective selfdefense in the event of an armed attack against it, plenary jurisdiction over its territory, the prohibition of intervention in matters essentially within its domestic jurisdiction, the possibility of membership in other intergovernmental organizations and specialized agencies, and full treaty making capacity. Statehood could also provide access to international courts and other dispute settlement mechanisms, including the International Court of Justice.[7]
The General Assembly Vote
On
September 23, 2011, Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority, presented
to the UN Secretary General an application for Palestine to be admitted to the UN
as a Member State. While that effort has not moved forward, blocked in the
Security Council, other efforts have. For instance, on October 31, 2011,
Palestine was admitted to the United Nations Education, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”), a specialized agency of the United Nations,
as a Member State.[8]
In the resolution adopted on November 29, the General Assembly, inter alia, “[r]eaffirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to independence in their State of Palestine on the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967” and “[d]ecides to accord to Palestine non-member observer State status in the United Nations, without prejudice to the acquired rights, privileges and role of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations as the representative of the Palestinian people, in accordance with the relevant resolutions and practice.” The resolution also “[e]xpresses the hope that the Security Council will consider favourably the application submitted on 23 September 2011 by the State of Palestine for admission to full membership in the United Nations” and “[u]rges all States, the specialized agencies and organizations of the United Nations system to continue to support and assist the Palestinian people in the early realization of their right to self-determination, independence and freedom.”
The resolution does not enumerate any expanded rights of participation in the UN system. In this sense, the resolution is largely symbolic. Indeed, prior to its designation as an observer state, Palestine already enjoyed rights of participation in the General Assembly comparable to those of an observer state.[9]
Nonetheless, the mere fact that the resolution was adopted constitutes a determination by the UN’s most representative political organ that Palestine is a state. By adopting a resolution that has little concrete significance within the framework of its own work, the General Assembly made clear that in according Palestine the status of an observer “state” it was signifying something beyond rights of participation. The issue of the day was statehood, not enhanced procedural rights in the political organs of the United Nations.
As for the vote,[10] the General Assembly resolution enjoyed broader support than did the UNESCO resolution. Of the Assembly’s 193 Member States, 138 voted in favor of the resolution, nine voted against, forty-one abstained, and five did not record any vote (owing to absence or otherwise). The 138 ‘yes’ votes comprised a broad cross-section of the globe, representing all regions and levels of development.[11] The nine ‘no’ votes consisted of Israel, Canada, the Czech Republic, Panama, the United States, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, and Palau.[12] Thus, the ‘yes’ votes greatly outnumbered the ‘no’ votes, and were representative of all regions. Weighing against these considerations is the significant number of abstentions, constituting just over 20% of the membership. In addition, several of the states that voted in favor of the resolution underscored that statehood could only be achieved through dialogue between the parties, implying that Palestine had not yet achieved statehood.[13]
While this vote certainly bolsters the claim that Palestine is a state, it might not be sufficient to cure any defects in Palestine’s satisfaction of the Montevideo criteria.[14]
ICC Jurisdiction
In the resolution adopted on November 29, the General Assembly, inter alia, “[r]eaffirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to independence in their State of Palestine on the Palestinian territory occupied since 1967” and “[d]ecides to accord to Palestine non-member observer State status in the United Nations, without prejudice to the acquired rights, privileges and role of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations as the representative of the Palestinian people, in accordance with the relevant resolutions and practice.” The resolution also “[e]xpresses the hope that the Security Council will consider favourably the application submitted on 23 September 2011 by the State of Palestine for admission to full membership in the United Nations” and “[u]rges all States, the specialized agencies and organizations of the United Nations system to continue to support and assist the Palestinian people in the early realization of their right to self-determination, independence and freedom.”
The resolution does not enumerate any expanded rights of participation in the UN system. In this sense, the resolution is largely symbolic. Indeed, prior to its designation as an observer state, Palestine already enjoyed rights of participation in the General Assembly comparable to those of an observer state.[9]
Nonetheless, the mere fact that the resolution was adopted constitutes a determination by the UN’s most representative political organ that Palestine is a state. By adopting a resolution that has little concrete significance within the framework of its own work, the General Assembly made clear that in according Palestine the status of an observer “state” it was signifying something beyond rights of participation. The issue of the day was statehood, not enhanced procedural rights in the political organs of the United Nations.
As for the vote,[10] the General Assembly resolution enjoyed broader support than did the UNESCO resolution. Of the Assembly’s 193 Member States, 138 voted in favor of the resolution, nine voted against, forty-one abstained, and five did not record any vote (owing to absence or otherwise). The 138 ‘yes’ votes comprised a broad cross-section of the globe, representing all regions and levels of development.[11] The nine ‘no’ votes consisted of Israel, Canada, the Czech Republic, Panama, the United States, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, and Palau.[12] Thus, the ‘yes’ votes greatly outnumbered the ‘no’ votes, and were representative of all regions. Weighing against these considerations is the significant number of abstentions, constituting just over 20% of the membership. In addition, several of the states that voted in favor of the resolution underscored that statehood could only be achieved through dialogue between the parties, implying that Palestine had not yet achieved statehood.[13]
While this vote certainly bolsters the claim that Palestine is a state, it might not be sufficient to cure any defects in Palestine’s satisfaction of the Montevideo criteria.[14]
ICC Jurisdiction
As
noted above, one sensitive issue is whether Palestine can consent to the
exercise of ICC jurisdiction over conduct that took place in Gaza and the West
Bank. Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute allows a “State which is not a Party to
this Statute” to accept the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction over crimes
committed by its nationals or within its territory. During the Israel–Gaza
armed conflict in late 2008 and early 2009 (“Operation Cast Lead”), the Palestinian
National Authority lodged a declaration with the ICC Registrar stating that it recognizes
“the jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of identifying, prosecuting and judging
the authors and accomplices of acts committed on the territory of Palestine
since 1 July 2002 [the entry into force date of the Rome Statute, the treaty
establishing the ICC].”[15] If Palestine is a state, it can enable the ICC to exercise
jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory, even if those crimes have
been committed by nationals of states that are not States Parties to the Rome
Statute, such as Israel.[16]
After the Palestinian Authority lodged its declaration with the ICC Registrar, the ICC Prosecutor reported that he was examining “first, whether the declaration accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court meets statutory requirements, and second, whether crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have been committed.”[17] The phrase “statutory requirements” presumably includes the question of whether or not Palestine is a “state” for the purposes of Article 12(3).[18]
On April 12, 2012, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC (“OTP”) released a statement indicating that it, for the moment, would not be considering allegations of crimes committed in Palestine.[19] The analysis referred, inter alia, to the practice of the UN Secretary- General as treaty depositary[20] and noted in particular that “the current status granted to Palestine by the United Nations General Assembly is that of ‘observer’ (sic), not as a ‘Non member State’”[21]
The statement concluded that the OTP “could in the future consider allegations of crimes committed in Palestine, should competent organs of the United Nations or eventually the Assembly of States Parties resolve the legal issue relevant to an assessment of article 12 or should the Security Council, in accordance with article 13(b), make a referral providing jurisdiction.”
The Prosecutor’s reference to the treaty practice of the United Nations may add some weight to the significance of the UNESCO and General Assembly votes. As with UN membership, the issue of treaty participation is distinct from the question of statehood.
Negotiating states can decide to make treaty participation available to entities other than fully independent or UN Member States.[22] Even where the text of a treaty limits participation to states (as does the ICC Statute), there may be a grey zone in which the treaty depositary is afforded a degree of discretion. On this latter point, the Prosecutor’s statement refers to an understanding adopted by the General Assembly at its 2202nd plenary meeting on December 14, 1973.[23] According to that understanding, “the Secretary-General, in discharging his functions as depositary of a convention with an ‘all States’ clause, will follow the practice of the Assembly in implementing such a clause and, whenever advisable, will request the opinion of the Assembly before receiving a signature or an instrument of ratification or accession.”[24] The OTP essentially used this understanding as a justification for punting the issue to the political organs of the United Nations, stating that “it is for the relevant bodies at the United Nations or the Assembly of States Parties to make the legal determination whether Palestine qualifies as a State....”[25]
In any event, the General Assembly has now determined that Palestine is a state. Given the OTP’s reliance on the practice of the Secretary General as treaty depositary and, in turn, on determinations by the “competent organs” of the United Nations, and by the General Assembly in particular, it would now seem more difficult for the OTP to maintain the position that it may not proceed with an examination of international crimes alleged to have been committed in Gaza and the West Bank. The pressure on the OTP to move forward will further increase if the situation in Palestine is referred to the OTP by a State Party to the ICC Statute. It should be noted, however, that the ICC has a new Prosecutor and she may reject the approach of her predecessor.[26] The OTP might rely less on the practice of the Secretary General as treaty depositary and political determinations by the General Assembly,[27] and instead frame the issue purely in terms of general international law, assessing the General Assembly vote through the lens of recognition rather than giving it determinative weight. In addition, even assuming that Palestine is a state for the purposes of Article 12(3), there remain a number of unresolved legal issues. Even if Palestine is now a state, was it a state at the time that it lodged its declaration of consent? Is it necessary that Palestine have been a state at that time, or is it sufficient that it is now a state? Could Palestine now submit a new declaration of consent with respect to past conduct? While Article 12(3) contemplates declaring consent in relation to prior conduct,[28] is it necessary that Palestine have been a state at the time of the alleged conduct?
As a practical matter, these legal ambiguities afford the ICC a degree of latitude in deciding whether to move forward. However, they also allow room for political choices. The challenge for the ICC will be to demonstrate that its decision is not a political choice, but that it is the result of legal analysis. Whatever decision it makes, it will likely be decried as a political choice by the opposing camps (either as yet another example of anti-Israel bias in international organizations or as caving to political pressure exerted by the United States). It will thus be all the more important for the ICC to provide a thorough, well-reasoned legal analysis in support of its course of action.
Ultimately, whether or not the General Assembly vote was sufficient to affirm the statehood of Palestine in general or to satisfy statutory requirements in the context of the ICC, it will likely have a snowball effect. The resolution increases the ability of Palestine to act like a state. The more it does so, the more clearly Palestine will satisfy the criteria for statehood. The train to statehood has clearly left the station.
About the Author:
After the Palestinian Authority lodged its declaration with the ICC Registrar, the ICC Prosecutor reported that he was examining “first, whether the declaration accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court meets statutory requirements, and second, whether crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have been committed.”[17] The phrase “statutory requirements” presumably includes the question of whether or not Palestine is a “state” for the purposes of Article 12(3).[18]
On April 12, 2012, the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC (“OTP”) released a statement indicating that it, for the moment, would not be considering allegations of crimes committed in Palestine.[19] The analysis referred, inter alia, to the practice of the UN Secretary- General as treaty depositary[20] and noted in particular that “the current status granted to Palestine by the United Nations General Assembly is that of ‘observer’ (sic), not as a ‘Non member State’”[21]
The statement concluded that the OTP “could in the future consider allegations of crimes committed in Palestine, should competent organs of the United Nations or eventually the Assembly of States Parties resolve the legal issue relevant to an assessment of article 12 or should the Security Council, in accordance with article 13(b), make a referral providing jurisdiction.”
The Prosecutor’s reference to the treaty practice of the United Nations may add some weight to the significance of the UNESCO and General Assembly votes. As with UN membership, the issue of treaty participation is distinct from the question of statehood.
Negotiating states can decide to make treaty participation available to entities other than fully independent or UN Member States.[22] Even where the text of a treaty limits participation to states (as does the ICC Statute), there may be a grey zone in which the treaty depositary is afforded a degree of discretion. On this latter point, the Prosecutor’s statement refers to an understanding adopted by the General Assembly at its 2202nd plenary meeting on December 14, 1973.[23] According to that understanding, “the Secretary-General, in discharging his functions as depositary of a convention with an ‘all States’ clause, will follow the practice of the Assembly in implementing such a clause and, whenever advisable, will request the opinion of the Assembly before receiving a signature or an instrument of ratification or accession.”[24] The OTP essentially used this understanding as a justification for punting the issue to the political organs of the United Nations, stating that “it is for the relevant bodies at the United Nations or the Assembly of States Parties to make the legal determination whether Palestine qualifies as a State....”[25]
In any event, the General Assembly has now determined that Palestine is a state. Given the OTP’s reliance on the practice of the Secretary General as treaty depositary and, in turn, on determinations by the “competent organs” of the United Nations, and by the General Assembly in particular, it would now seem more difficult for the OTP to maintain the position that it may not proceed with an examination of international crimes alleged to have been committed in Gaza and the West Bank. The pressure on the OTP to move forward will further increase if the situation in Palestine is referred to the OTP by a State Party to the ICC Statute. It should be noted, however, that the ICC has a new Prosecutor and she may reject the approach of her predecessor.[26] The OTP might rely less on the practice of the Secretary General as treaty depositary and political determinations by the General Assembly,[27] and instead frame the issue purely in terms of general international law, assessing the General Assembly vote through the lens of recognition rather than giving it determinative weight. In addition, even assuming that Palestine is a state for the purposes of Article 12(3), there remain a number of unresolved legal issues. Even if Palestine is now a state, was it a state at the time that it lodged its declaration of consent? Is it necessary that Palestine have been a state at that time, or is it sufficient that it is now a state? Could Palestine now submit a new declaration of consent with respect to past conduct? While Article 12(3) contemplates declaring consent in relation to prior conduct,[28] is it necessary that Palestine have been a state at the time of the alleged conduct?
As a practical matter, these legal ambiguities afford the ICC a degree of latitude in deciding whether to move forward. However, they also allow room for political choices. The challenge for the ICC will be to demonstrate that its decision is not a political choice, but that it is the result of legal analysis. Whatever decision it makes, it will likely be decried as a political choice by the opposing camps (either as yet another example of anti-Israel bias in international organizations or as caving to political pressure exerted by the United States). It will thus be all the more important for the ICC to provide a thorough, well-reasoned legal analysis in support of its course of action.
Ultimately, whether or not the General Assembly vote was sufficient to affirm the statehood of Palestine in general or to satisfy statutory requirements in the context of the ICC, it will likely have a snowball effect. The resolution increases the ability of Palestine to act like a state. The more it does so, the more clearly Palestine will satisfy the criteria for statehood. The train to statehood has clearly left the station.
About the Author:
John
Cerone, an ASIL member, is Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International
Law & Policy at New England Law | Boston.
Endnotes:
[1]
G.A. Res 67/19, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/19 (Nov. 29, 2012), available
at http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r67.shtml
[2]
The various categories of observer status described in the “Blue
Book” of the UN Protocol and Liaison Service include: non-Member States
maintaining permanent observer missions at UN Headquarters (e.g., the Holy
See/Vatican City); Entities maintaining permanent observer missions at UN
Headquarters (e.g., Palestine); Intergovernmental Organizations maintaining
permanent offices at UN Headquarters (e.g., regional intergovernmental
organizations); and Other Entities maintaining permanent offices at UN Headquarters
(e.g., the Sovereign Military Order of Malta and the International Committee of
the Red Cross). Even within each category, different observers may have
different rights of participation. Nongovernmental organizations are eligible
for a more limited status, known as “consultative status,” which is regulated
by Resolution 1996/31 of the UN’s Economic and Social Council. See E.S.C.
Res. 1996/31, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1996/31 (July 25, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996-31.htm.
[3] The term “non-Member State observer” seems to have caused a degree of confusion. The prefix “non” modifies only “Member,” and does not refer to all observers that are not Member States (which would of course be redundant in any event). It is perhaps for that reason that the General Assembly was careful to formulate the designation for Palestine as “non-member observer State”.
[4] The Montevideo criteria, described in the previous Insight and set forth in the 1933 Montevideo Convention, are now widely accepted as the definitive criteria for the establishment of statehood. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 U.N.T.S. 21, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a 40.html; see also Stephen McCaffrey, Dinah Shelton & John Cerone, Public International Law: Cases, Problems, & Texts 439 (2010). The United States referred to the Montevideo criteria in asserting the statehood of Kosovo at a time when fewer than sixty states had recognized Kosovo. See Written Statement of the United States of America Concerning the Request of the UN General Assembly for an Advisory Opinion on the Question of the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15640.pdf. For one U.S. court’s assessment of whether Palestine satisfied the Montevideo criteria as of 2004, see Knox v. PLO, 306 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
[5] In order for a new state to come into existence, it must meet the so-called Montevideo criteria: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) a government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.
[6] For example, collective non-recognition could effectively prevent fulfillment of the fourth Montevideo criterion. Collective recognition, on the other hand, reflects an authoritative opinion that the criteria have been met, even if, from a more “scientific” perspective, there might appear to be a shortfall.
[7] While it cannot be a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) without Security Council approval, it may be able to access the ICJ under Article 35(2) of its Statute and pursuant to Security Council Resolution 9 (1946), which allows states not parties to the ICJ Statute to file a declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction. Israel has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Nonetheless, many multilateral treaties contain compromissory clauses, conferring jurisdiction on the ICJ for disputes arising under those treaties. While Israel is a party to several such treaties, it frequently enters reservations to the compromissory clauses. Israel did not enter reservations to the Genocide Convention or the Convention on the Political Rights of Women. However, those treaties do not use the all “states formula.” Accession to those treaties is open only to UN Member States and other states invited by the General Assembly to accede, which would not include Palestine at this time.
[8] Palestine’s membership application received 107 “yes” votes at the UNESCO General Conference. Even though there were 185 UNESCO Member States entitled to vote, the 107 “yes” votes were sufficient to meet the 2/3 bar for membership, since the 2/3 calculation is based on UNESCO Member States present and voting. (Of the 173 Member States present, fifty-two states abstained, meaning that Palestine only needed eighty-one “yes” votes to be admitted.) Overall, Palestine’s membership bid attracted the supporting votes of approximately 58% of the total UNESCO membership. See Introductory Note to the Admission of Palestine into the United Nations, 51 I.L.M. 606 (2012).
[9] Indeed, until 2004, Palestine enjoyed greater rights of participation in the General Assembly than did the Holy See, which has had the status Observer State since 1964.
[10] The legal significance of the General Assembly vote can be assessed strictly within the framework of the United Nations Charter, where it has its most immediate impact, and it can also be assessed in the broader context of international law. Assessing the resolution’s legal value in this broader context requires an examination of both its content and the conditions of its adoption.
[11] Satisfying even the 2/3 bar were this issue to be regarded as an "important question." "Important questions" must be decided by the General Assembly "by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting." See U.N. Charter ch. IV, art. 18.
[12] The latter four states are former Trust Territories of, or have been in association with, the United States and tend to support its positions in the UN.
[13] In addition, a handful of states, including some that had voted in favor of the resolution, asserted that their vote should not be construed as recognition of the state of Palestine. See, e.g., the statement of the New Zealand delegation that “the question of recognition of a Palestinian State was a separate issue.” Press Release, General Assambly, General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine “Non-Member Observer State” Status in United Nations, U.N. Press Release GA/11317 (Nov. 29, 2012), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/ga11317.doc.htm.
[14] Speaking before the vote Israel’s representative asserted that the “Palestinian Authority . . . clearly fails to meet the criteria for statehood.”
[15] Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Jan. 21, 2009) (submitted on behalf of the Palestinian National Authority), available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/74EEE201-0FED-4481-95D4-
C8071087102C/279777/20090122PalestinianDeclaration2.pdf.
[16] The ICC has jurisdiction only to prosecute individuals and has no authority to bring proceedings against a state. It would be able to exercise jurisdiction over all international crimes committed in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as over all international crimes committed by Palestinian nationals anywhere.
[17] Rep. of the Int’l Crim. Ct. to the UN General Assembly, § 81, A/65/313 (Aug. 19, 2010).
[18] It might also include the question of the territorial scope of Palestine, and whether the Palestinian Authority is legally competent to represent Palestine in the international legal system or whether its authority extends to Gaza.
[19] Contrary to some reports, the OTP did not state that it was rejecting Palestine’s declaration of consent or that it lacked jurisdiction to proceed.
[20] Int’l Crim. Ct. Office of the Prosecutor, Statement: Situation in Palestine (Apr. 3, 2012), available at http://www.icc cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf [hereinafter Situation in Palestine].
[21] Id. § 7. Presumably they meant “observer entity”.
[22] See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] art. 305, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
[23] See Situation in Palestine, supra note 20, n.3.
[24] See Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties. However, the Summary of Practice also includes reference to the so-called “Vienna formula.” The “Vienna formula” is drawn from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to Article 81 of that instrument, “[t]he present Convention shall be open for signature by all States Members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency or parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State invited by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to the Convention . . . .” The Summary of Practice seems to indicate that the Secretary-General will only seek the guidance of the General Assembly where a purported state does not fall within this formula (i.e., that a treaty open to participation by “all states” will presumably be open to any purported state that falls within the Vienna formula). Following its admission into UNESCO, a specialized agency of the United Nations, Palestine arguably falls within the Vienna formula. Introductory Note to the Admission of Palestine into the United Nations, supra note 8; see also Larry D. Johnson, Palestine's Admission to UNESCO: Consequences Within the UN?, 40 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 1-3, 118 (2012).
[25] “In interpreting and applying article 12 of the Rome Statute, the Office has assessed that it is for the relevant bodies at the United Nations or the Assembly of States Parties to make the legal determination whether Palestine qualifies as a State for the purpose of acceding to the Rome Statute and thereby enabling the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court under article 12(1). The Rome Statute provides no authority for the Office of the Prosecutor to adopt a method to define the term ‘State’ under article 12(3) which would be at variance with that established for the purpose of article 12(1).”
[26] In September 2012, the ICC Prosecutor suggested that the OTP would re-visit its assessment if the General Assembly were to act on the matter. See “The International Criminal Court: A New Approach to International Relations,” Speaker Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Sept. 21, 2012, Council on Foreign Relations (“But what we have also done is to leave the door open and to say that if this -- if Palestine is able to pass over that hurdle, of course, under the General Assembly, then we will revisit what the ICC can do.”).
[27] Underlying the issue of whether it is appropriate for the OTP to analogize to the practice of the Secretary General as treaty depositary is the more theoretical question of whether the OTP is more of a political organ or a judicial organ. The role of prosecutors in this respect varies significantly among states.
[28] See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 11(2), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
Philippe
WECKEL, « La Résolution 67/19 du 29 novembre 2012, l'acte de naissance de
la Palestine ? », Sentinelle,
2 décembre 2012, n°326
1. La résolution
a. Les résultats du vote
Bien que 132
Etats aient déjà reconnu l’Etat palestinien, la Résolution 67/19 du 29 novembre
2012 n’a recueilli que 138 voix, alors même que 15 Etats de l’Union européenne
ont voté favorablement. Le vote révèle donc les limites de ces reconnaissances,
actes discrétionnaires et politiques, qui obéissent à des motivations diverses
propres à chaque Etat ou plutôt à chaque gouvernement. Néanmoins, ces 138 voix
correspondent aux deux tiers des membres de l’ONU.
L’élément le
plus frappant et le plus dérangeant dans ce vote est l’isolement d’Israël et
des Etats-Unis. Malgré une intense campagne de près de deux ans auprès des
délégations et des gouvernements, Israël et les Etats-Unis ont réalisé un score
historiquement bas de 9 voix contre. Ils n’ont obtenu l’alignement que de deux
Etats importants, le Canada et la République tchèque en plus d’une poignée de
petits Etats liges dont les Etats-Unis s’assurent systématiquement le soutien.
Sans l’appui actif des Etats-Unis, Israël aurait vraisemblablement été seul
face à tous les Etats membres de l’ONU.
Avec ce soutien américain Israël pèse encore 5% des voix à l’Assemblée
générale, grâce à Pulau notamment…
46 Etats ont
opté pour la neutralité en l’affichant par l’abstention ou en étant absents
lors du vote. En d’autres termes 183 Etats ont marqué leur distance avec Israël
ou la politique de son gouvernement actuel. Le cas de l’Union européenne est
exemplaire. En effet lors du vote similaire à l’UNESCO en 2011 les Etats
européens se sont pour l’essentiel répartis entre votes contre et vote pour (11
et 11). A l’Assemblée générale seule la République tchèque a voté contre et les
Etats favorables à la résolution ont été nettement majoritaires (15 Etats).
Même l’Allemagne et l’Italie se sont éloignées d’Israël. Il s’agit donc d’un
vote de défiance, non à l’encontre d’Israël, mais d’un gouvernement qui ne sait
pas répondre à l’aspiration générale à la paix. Comme cela était prévisible, la
récente crise à Gaza a fait basculer certains Etats dans l’abstention dans les
derniers jours qui ont précédé le vote. Quelle que soit sa politique de
communication, le gouvernement israélien ne convainc pas. En outre
l’affaiblement du leadership américain
est le principal dommage collatéral de cette défiance générale. Finalement
cette sanction politique que constitue l’adoption de la Résolution solde
l’échec du processus d’Annapolis, la dernière tentative de règlement négocié du
conflit israélo-palestinien.
______________________________________
Vote
on Status of Palestine at United Nations
The draft
resolution on the Status of Palestine at the United Nations (document
A/67/L.28) was adopted by a recorded vote of 138 in favour to 9 against, with
41 abstentions, as follows:
In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,
Chile, China, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus,
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, France,
Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malaysia,
Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique,
Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon
Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste,
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab
Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet
Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Against: Canada, Czech Republic, Israel, Marshall
Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Palau, Panama, United States.
Abstain: Albania, Andorra, Australia, Bahamas,
Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Colombia, Croatia,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Estonia, Fiji, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Poland, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, The former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, United Kingdom, Vanuatu.
Absent: Equatorial Guinea, Kiribati, Liberia,
Madagascar, Ukraine.
______________________________________
b. Le contenu de la résolution
La version
définitive de la Résolution comporte des améliorations substantielles par
rapport à la version initiale. Le Président Abbas est parvenu pourtant à
maintenir intégralement l’esprit de la rédaction initiale. Il a su ne pas céder
sur certains points. Il n’y a pas de renonciation à la saisine de la Cour
pénale internationale (on ne peut renoncer à la justice). Il n’y a pas
d’engagement à reprendre immédiatement les négociations (des pourparlers
préalables peuvent être inconditionnels, pas une véritable négociation de
paix). En agissant ainsi, le Président Abbas a sous doute perdu quelques voix,
mais ce texte, par son contenu, est bien plus qu’une simple décision
d’admission d’un Etat observateur.
Ce texte très
long n’est pas déséquilibré et il ne préjuge pas l’issue de la négociation à
venir entre Israël et la Palestine. D’ailleurs, on n’a pas entendu de telles
critiques à l’Assemblée générale pourtant habituelles lorsqu’il est question
d’Israël. La formulation a été travaillée avec soin. Même la question de
Jérusalem a été présentée d’une manière qui ne peut susciter la controverse.
En agissant
ainsi le Président palestinien s’est procuré un instrument qui réunit de
manière synthétique, mais complète, tous les éléments nécessaires à la partie
palestinienne pour s’engager dans une négociation avec Israël sur des bases
claires et généralement acceptées. Les abstentions et les votes contre ont
exprimé des désaccords sur des aspects extérieurs à la négociation en soi. Même
Israël et les Etats-Unis, concentrés sur la décision d’admission, ont omis de
contester la substance de ce texte. Créant volontairement un parallèle avec la
Résolution 181 du… 29 novembre 1947 le Président Abbas a, à la faveur de la
décision d’admission en tant qu’Etat observateur, obtenu de l’Assemblée qu’elle
définisse le cadre précis du partage de l’ancienne Palestine en complément de
la Résolution de 1947. Il sera difficile de n’accorder à cette seconde
résolution qu’une portée organique. Le Président Abbas ne s’en est pas caché en
qualifiant la décision d’ « acte de naissance de la Palestine ».
2. La portée de la décision de l’Assemblée
générale
On annonce de
source crédible (Barack Ravid) que le Premier ministre israélien aurait décidé,
par représailles contre la résolution de l’ONU, la construction de 3000
logements dans le secteur le plus sensible (E1) de la zone de Jérusalem. On
espère qu’il s’abstiendra de confirmer une telle mesure qui apparaîtrait comme
une provocation envers la communauté internationale. Quel message entend
transmettre Israël à ces meilleurs amis en franchissant la ligne rouge que
constituent les constructions dans le secteur E1 ? En vérité cette réaction du
Premier ministre montre qu’Israël, comme les Etats-Unis, sont dans l’incapacité
de développer une parade efficace à la situation créée par la Résolution de
l’Assemblée générale. L’Autorité de Ramallah survit sous assistance
internationale et débrancher les appareils n’est pas une option. Bien plus, la
Résolution est une bombe à retardement qui va provoquer une série d’explosions
préjudiciables aux Etats-Unis, selon le rythme choisi par le Président Abbas.
En Effet l’Exécutif sera contraint par la loi de suspendre la participation
financière des Etats-Unis à toutes les institutions spécialisées du système des
Nations Unis qui admettront la Palestine comme membre. Qu’on l’accepte ou non,
la Résolution entraîne un rééquilibrage dans le rapport de force entre
Israéliens et Palestiniens.
a. Le processus de paix
L’adoption de la
résolution intervient à un moment très difficile dans lequel la relance
immédiate du processus de paix semble exclue.
En provoquant
des élections anticipées le Premier ministre israélien M. B. Netanyahou,
semblait s’assurer d’une confortable réélection. Alors que s’ouvre la campagne
électorale sa situation semble plus compliquée. Le centre de gravité de son
parti, le Likoud, se déplace nettement vers la droite et son allié M. Ehud
Barak quitte la vie politique. Les partis politiques favorables à la paix
semblent pouvoir se renforcer. Madame Tzipi Livni, ministre des affaires
étrangères du gouvernement Olmert, se relance en politique en créant son propre
parti et en exprimant son adhésion au règlement rapide du conflit historique
sur la Palestine. L’ancien Premier ministre M. Ehud Olmert dont le discours sur
la paix à la Knesset fera date a même approuvé explicetement la Résolution
67/19 de l’Assemblée générale : "Je ne vois aucune raison de s'opposer. Je
crois que la demande palestinienne est en harmonie avec le concept fondamental
de la solution à deux Etats". « Mahmoud Abbas et Salam Fayyad ont besoin
de notre aide. C'est le moment de le faire". "En tant qu'Israéliens,
nous devrons nous engager dans un processus de négociations sérieux, afin de
convenir des frontières spécifiques, sur la base des lignes de 1967, et de
résoudre les autres questions". Si les courants pro-paix devaient
l’emporter à l’issue des élections de janvier ou à la faveur d’un changement de
coalition gouvernementale, la Résolution de l’Assemblée générale deviendrait
paradoxalement la base de négociation entre Israéliens et Palestiniens.
Le processus de
réconciliation inter-palestinienne est paralysé depuis plusieurs mois. Pourtant
le Hamas a apporté son soutien net à l’initiative du Présent Abbas et à la
création d’un Etat palestinien dans les limites de 1967. Bien sûr les
ambiguïtés ne sont pas levées, parce que le mouvement continue de prôner la
lutte armée. Le nouvel Etat ne serait finalement qu’une étape vers la
reconstitution d’une grande Palestine et donc la disparition d’Israël.
Néanmoins on n’entend pas les mêmes discours chez le chef du « gouvernement » à
Gaza M. I. Haniyeh et le chef du mouvement, K. Mechaal. Vis-à-vis de l’opinion
publique palestinienne, le Hamas pourrait-il se maintenir au milieu du gué si
le processus de paix était engagé de manière crédible ?
Actuellement
plongé dans les embarras budgétaires, le Président Obama ne regarde pas la
situation au Proche-Orient comme une priorité et il n’est sans-doute pas séduit
par l’idée d’être confronté aux mêmes difficultés que son prédécesseur sur ce
dossier. Peut-il pour autant s’accommoder du pourrissement de la situation
actuelle pendant les quatre années de son deuxième mandat ? Il ne refuserait
pas l’opportunité d’inscrire son nom dans l’Histoire si la possibilité d’un
règlement définitif du conflit israélo-palestinien se profilait.
L’initiative de
faire adopter cette résolution intervient-elle à un mauvais moment ? Qui le
sait ? Qui peut le dire ? Elle offre une possibilité de faire bouger les
lignes. Le gouvernement israélien actuel est favorable à la reprise des
discussions directes avec les Palestiniens, mais s’agit-il de poursuivre, voire
de recommencer, des négociations exploratoires ou bien d’engager des
négociations sérieuses en vue d’un accord définitif, sur la base d’un
calendrier et avec des négociateurs munis d’un véritable mandat de négocier ?
Si la Résolution empêche seulement les discussions préliminaires et
exploratoires, cette conséquence n’est pas très grave. La simple reprise des
discussions n'est pas la négociation.
Par contre la
Résolution apporte un appui clair à la partie palestinienne. Le rehaussement de
la représentation palestinienne a son prolongement dans la négociation avec
Israël. Il met les deux parties sur un pied d’égalité. Ainsi, l’Autorité de
Ramallah négociera et s’engagera en tant qu’Etat. En outre, la délégation
palestinienne pourra s’appuyer sur la Résolution pour déterminer les bases de
la négociation : il n’est plus question de convenir des limites territoriales
autrement qu’en partant de la ligne verte définissant le territoire occupé,
etc. Pour avoir trop tardé, Israël sera contraint de négocier dans une position
plus difficile : on ne peut pas échanger ce que l’on ne possède pas et la
Puissance occupante doit quitter le territoire. Les seules garanties d’Israël
sont celles qui résultent explicitement ou implicitement de la Résolution, par
exemple la possibilité de conserver les grands blocs de colonies par un échange
de terres. La Résolution rapproche donc Israël de la perspective des sacrifices
douloureux qu’impose la paix.
b. La participation de la Palestine à la vie
internationale
-
La portée décisoire de la Résolution
Dans son avis
sur le Mur… la Cour internationale de Justice a confirmé que la responsabilité
de l’ONU et, plus particulièrement celle de l’Assemblée générale, à l’égard de
la question palestinienne trouve son origine dans le Mandat et la résolution
181 de 1947 (Avis du 9 juillet 2004, p.159).
Cette responsabilité, selon elle, présente un caractère permanent.
Dans son avis de
1951, Conséquences juridiques… la Cour avait reconnu à l’Assemblée générale le
pouvoir de mettre fin à un Mandat du fait de la violation par le Mandataire de
ses obligations (Avis du 21 juin 1971). Elle avait justifié cette solution en
présentant le Mandat comme un accord et une institution. Or il convient
d’observer que la résolution 181 s’inscrit dans le même type de relations,
puisque l’Etat mandataire en Palestine avait demandé à l’Assemblée générale de
fixer le sort du territoire en s’engageant par avance à respecter ses
recommandations. Ensemble, l’Assemblée générale et le Mandataire détenaient le
pouvoir de déterminer le statut futur du territoire, dans le respect du
principe d’autodétermination des peuples. La Résolution 181 liée à la demande
britannique est donc une décision qui s’impose à tous les Etats et qu’Israël a
d’ailleurs reconnue (« Il serait en effet inexact de supposer que, parce qu'elle possède
en principe le
pouvoir de faire des
recommandations, l'Assemblée
générale est empêchée d'adopter,
dans des cas déterminés relevant de sa compétence, des
résolutions ayant le caractère de décisions ou procédant d'une intention d'exécution », Avis de 1951, p. 38).
La Résolution
67/19 du 29 novembre 2012 complète et ajuste le plan de partage de 1947 et
forme avec la première résolution un ensemble définitif ayant la même portée
décisoire. Sa portée ne se limite donc pas au rehaussement de la représentation
palestinienne à l’ONU qui n’est pas son objet et son but. Ce dernier est en
effet d’établir, en vertu des pouvoirs de l’Assemblée générale, un processus
d’autodétermination et d’accession à la pleine souveraineté de l’Etat
palestinien passant par un accord négocié avec Israël.
Occupées avec
des hochets comme la saisine de la Cour pénale internationale, les délégations
n’ont rien vu venir (nous non plus). Elles n’ont pas réagi au surgissement de
la résolution 181 de 1947, comme la Statue du Commandeur, un deus ex machina
convoqué par un habile sorcier. Le Président Abbas a réussi une véritable
prouesse diplomatique : ce qui ne devait être qu’une pauvre compensation à
l’échec provisoire de l’admission en tant que membre de l’ONU a été
complètement retourné à l’avantage de la partie palestinienne pour constituer
un véritable titre comme l’a été la Résolution 181 pour Israël.
Avec un peu de
recul, le gouvernement israélien a bien compris la portée de la Résolution du
29 novembre 2012. La déclaration publiée à l'issue de la réunion du Cabinet le
2 décembre ne se réfère pas du tout au rehaussement du statut de l'Autorité de
Ramallah, mais bien aux conditions du partage de la Palestine, telles qu'elles
sont définies par la décision de l'Assemblée générale, qu'il rejette en
invoquant un titre historique sur la Judée et la Samarie :
"The Jewish
People has a natural, historical and legal right to his homeland and to its
eternal capital, Jerusalem; the State of Israel, as the state of the Jewish
People, has a right and claim to areas, the status of which is under dispute,
in the Land of Israel. Therefore:
* To reject UN General Assembly Resolution
67/191, of 29 November 2012.
* To determine that there is nothing in the
aforesaid resolution that changes the status of the areas under dispute, that
grants any right or that detracts from of the State of Israel's, or the Jewish
People's, rights whatsoever in the Land of Israel.
* To determine that the aforesaid decision
will not constitute a basis for future negotiations, and that it contains
nothing that advances a solution by peaceful means."
-
L’admission dans diverses instances de l’ONU
Cour
internationale de Justice
La Palestine ne
peut espérer participer à une procédure contentieuse devant la Cour en tant que
partie. En effet, elle ne pourrait y être autorisée par l’Assemblée générale
que sur recommandation du Conseil de sécurité.
Charte, article
93, al. 2 : « Les conditions dans lesquelles les États qui ne sont pas Membres
de l'Organisation peuvent devenir parties au Statut de la Cour internationale
de Justice sont déterminées, dans chaque cas, par l'Assemblée générale sur
recommandation du Conseil de sécurité ».
Programmes de
l’ONU
La Palestine
peut être élue par l’ECOSOC au conseil d’administration de divers programmes
comme le PNUD ou le PAM
-
L’admission dans les institutions spécialisées du Système des Nations Unies
UNESCO
La Palestine a été
admise comme membre en 2011
FAO
Statut – Art.
II, 2. « La Conférence peut, à la majorité des deux tiers des suffrages
exprimés et sous réserve que la majorité des Etats Membres de l'Organisation
soient présents, décider d'admettre à la qualité de membre de l'Organisation
tout Etat qui a déposé une demande d'admission accompagnée d'un instrument
officiel par lequel il accepte les obligations découlant de l'Acte constitutif
en vigueur au moment de l'admission ».
OIT
Constitution –
Article 1, MEMBRES
« 2. Les Membres
de l'Organisation Internationale du Travail seront les Etats qui étaient
Membres de l'Organisation au 1er novembre 1945 et tous autres Etats qui
deviendraient Membres conformément aux dispositions des paragraphes 3 et 4 du
présent article.
3. Tout Membre
originaire des Nations Unies et tout Etat admis en qualité de Membre des
Nations Unies par décision de l'Assemblée générale conformément aux
dispositions de la Charte peut devenir Membre de l'Organisation internationale
du Travail en communiquant au Directeur général du Bureau international du
Travail son acceptation formelle des obligations découlant de la Constitution
de l'Organisation Internationale du Travail.
4. La Conférence
générale de l'Organisation Internationale du Travail peut également admettre
des Membres dans l'Organisation à la majorité des deux tiers des délégués
présents à la session, y compris les deux tiers des délégués gouvernementaux
présents et votants. Cette admission deviendra effective lorsque le
gouvernement du nouveau Membre aura communiqué au Directeur général du Bureau
international du Travail son acceptation formelle des obligations découlant de
la Constitution de l'Organisation ».
FIDA
Statut – Art.
13, c) « Les États énumérés à l’annexe I qui ne sont pas devenus parties au
présent Accord dans un délai d’un an à dater de son entrée en vigueur et les
États qui ne sont pas énumérés à l’annexe I peuvent devenir parties au présent
Accord par dépôt d’un instrument d’adhésion après approbation de leur admission
comme Membres par le Conseil des gouverneurs ».
UIT
Constitution –
Art. 2 – Composition de l’UIT
« c) Les États
énumérés à l’annexe I qui ne sont pas devenus parties au présent Accord dans un
délai d’un an à dater de son entrée en vigueur et les États qui ne sont pas
énumérés à l’annexe I peuvent devenir parties au présent Accord par dépôt d’un
instrument d’adhésion après approbation de leur admission comme Membres par le
Conseil des gouverneurs ».
FMI
Réglementation
générale — Règles et Règlements du Fonds monétaire international - Section 21. Demandes d'admission
a) Tout pays
peut solliciter son admission au Fonds en déposant une demande dûment circonstanciée
auprès du Fonds.
b) Le Conseil
d'administration fera rapport sur toutes les demandes d'admission au Conseil
des gouverneurs. Lorsqu'il transmet une demande au Conseil des gouverneurs avec
une recommandation tendant à l'admission du pays candidat, le Conseil
d'administration, après consultations avec le pays intéressé, recommandera au
Conseil des gouverneurs le montant de la quote-part, la forme du versement de
la souscription et toutes autres conditions qu'à son avis le Conseil des
gouverneurs pourrait souhaiter prescrire.
Etc.
-
Le cas particulier de la Cour pénale internationale
Dispositions
pertinentes du Statut de Rome
Article 125 - Signature,
ratification, acceptation, approbation ou adhésion
3. Le présent Statut est ouvert à l'adhésion
de tous les États. Les instruments d'adhésion seront déposés auprès du
Secrétaire général de l'Organisation des Nations Unies.
Article 126 - Entrée en
vigueur
2. À l'égard de chaque État qui ratifie, accepte
ou approuve le présent Statut ou y adhère après le dépôt du soixantième instrument
de ratification, d'acceptation, d'approbation ou d'adhésion, le Statut entre en
vigueur le premier jour du mois suivant le soixantième jour après le dépôt par
cet État de son instrument de ratification, d'acceptation, d'approbation ou
d'adhésion.
_____________________
Article 11 - Compétence
ratione temporis
1. La Cour n'a compétence qu'à l'égard des
crimes relevant de sa compétence commis après l'entrée en vigueur du présent
Statut.
2. Si un État devient Partie au présent Statut
après l'entrée en vigueur de celui-ci, la Cour ne peut exercer sa compétence
qu'à l'égard des crimes commis après l'entrée en vigueur du Statut pour cet
État, sauf si ledit État fait la déclaration prévue à l'article 12, paragraphe
3.
Article 12 - Conditions
préalables à l'exercice de la compétence
1. Un État qui devient Partie au Statut accepte
par là même la compétence de la Cour à l'égard des crimes visés à l'article 5.
2. Dans les cas visés à l'article 13,
paragraphes a) ou c), la Cour peut exercer sa compétence si l'un des États
suivants ou les deux sont Parties au présent Statut ou ont accepté la
compétence de la Cour conformément au paragraphe 3 :
a) L'État sur le territoire duquel le
comportement en cause a eu lieu ou, si le crime a été commis à bord d'un navire
ou d'un aéronef, l'État du pavillon ou l'État d'immatriculation ;
b) L'État dont la personne accusée du crime est
un ressortissant.
3. Si l'acceptation de la compétence de la Cour par un État qui n'est pas Partie au
présent Statut est nécessaire aux fins du paragraphe 2, cet État peut, par
déclaration déposée auprès du Greffier, consentir à ce que la Cour exerce sa
compétence à l'égard du crime dont il s'agit. L'État ayant accepté la
compétence de la Cour coopère avec celle-ci sans retard et sans exception
conformément au chapitre IX.
Article 14 - Renvoi d'une
situation par un État Partie
1. Tout État Partie peut déférer au Procureur
une situation dans laquelle un ou plusieurs des crimes relevant de la
compétence de la Cour paraissent avoir été commis, et prier le Procureur
d'enquêter sur cette situation en vue de déterminer si une ou plusieurs
personnes identifiées devraient être accusées de ces crimes.
2. L'État qui procède au renvoi indique autant
que possible les circonstances pertinentes de l'affaire et produit les pièces à
l'appui dont il dispose.
Observations
La possibilité
pour la Palestine d’adhérer au Statut ne semble pas faire de doute. En tant que
telle l’adhésion ne produira d’effet que 60 jours après le dépôt de
l’instrument de ratification. Néanmoins, l’Autorité palestinienne a déjà fait
une déclaration au titre de l’article 12 al. 3 du Statut. Si elle est
recevable, elle établit la compétence de la Cour indépendamment de l’adhésion
de la Palestine au Statut. Le Procureur ne s’est pas prononcé définitivement
(voir la déclaration du 3 avril 2012) et il appartient seule à la Cour
d’apprécier si cette demande émane bien d’un Etat au sens du Statut.
La Palestine
peut être tentée d’orienter l’exercice par la Cour de sa compétence de manière
à mettre en cause uniquement des responsables israéliens ou les crimes pouvant
résulter de l’occupation israélienne. Il appartient à la Cour d’apprécier,
comme tout tribunal international, si la mise en œuvre de sa compétence est compatible
avec l’exercice de sa fonction juridictionnelle, eu égard notamment à
l’exigence d’impartialité. En pratique ce serait inutile parce que la CPI peut
s’autosaisir. Au demeurant la compétence de la Cour est complémentaire de celle
des Etats concernés. Israël pourrait donc à tout moment de la procédure
demander la suspension de cette dernière s’il exerce des poursuites contre les
suspects israéliens.
En prenant appui
sur la Déclaration de l’article 12 al. 3 plutôt que sur l’adhésion de la
Palestine et, éventuellement, un renvoi décidé par le nouvel Etat, la Cour
contournerait toute difficulté relative à l’impartialité de son action. En
effet la déclaration palestinienne de 2011 donne compétence à la Cour au sujet
de tout crime commis sur le territoire palestinien depuis le 1er juillet 2002.
Le Procureur a d'ailleurs exprimé son intention d'examiner les implications de
la Résolution de l'Assemblée générale. Prendre appui sur la déclaration
palestinienne de 2011 serait la meilleure solution pour prévenir toute critique
d'instrumentalisation politique de la Cour.
Les activistes
palestiniens n’échapperaient donc pas à la compétence de la Cour. Demain ou
dans cinq ans, dix ans, le centre de détention de Scheveningen accueillera
vraisemblablement des responsables du Hamas. Des Israéliens aussi ?
Probablement… Il n’est pas sûr que l’on soit pressé, d’un côté comme de
l’autre, de voir la Cour s’intéresser à la situation en Palestine.
…
- Adhésion aux
traités multilatéraux ouverts
La qualité
d’Etat ouvre à la Palestine l’accès à tous les traités multilatéraux ouverts. Une
telle adhésion est vivement souhaitable, parce qu’elle offre des garanties
d’évolution du système politique et administratif de l’Etat en formation en
conformité avec les exigences de l’Etat de droit. On peut supposer que l’Union
européenne incitera fortement l’Autorité de Ramallah à s’engager dans cette
voie.
A LIRE :
- Beligh NABLI, « Israël : une réponse coloniale illégale », Libération, 10 décembre 2012
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