Jean-Baptiste HARELIMANA
The purported tension between peace and justice is well-known, and it continues to be real and important. This paper will focus upon challenges and opportunities for pursuing “holistic” peace and justice simultaneously.
How to implement the Rome Statute where conflict resolution initiative are ongoing or are in the process of implementation? What happens - and what should happen - when efforts to prosecute perpetrators of mass atrocities coincide with a peace process? What is the best approach when the price of a peace deal seems to be a degree of impunity for those most responsible for such abuses?
The Rome Statute’s entry into force in July 2002 represented the culmination of massive international effort to address impunity. Its central features are its permanence and international nature, bringing distinct advantages over some domestic transitional processes and some ad hoc processes.
The international community including, notably, African countries, played a significant role in the negotiation of a compressive and robust treaty which lays the foundations for an effective international strategy for the prosecution of the most serious crimes of international concern, namely genocide, war crime and crime against humanity, and attainment of justice for the victims of those crimes. Very significantly, the establishment of the ICC (and the creation of ad hoc tribunals and special courts before it) also signaled the conviction of the international community that the justice is an intrinsic component of durable peace.
The idea of a permanent international criminal court dates back to the war crimes trials of the major war criminals of the Axis powers after World War II. The lesson of Nuremberg and Tokyo was simple: in order to avoid genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, those responsible for such crimes must be brought to justice. Thus, in the 1950s, a Statute of an international criminal Court and a Code of crimes against mankind were drafted and discussed within the framework of the United Nations. The Cold War, however, brought this development to a temporary halt.
With the end of the Cold War, new development was possible. The gruesome conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda convinced the international community that the time for international criminal justice was ripe. The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) also paved the ground for a more ambitious goal: the establishment of a permanent ICC. In the summer of 1998, representatives of more than 160 States and of more than 250 non-governmental organizations met in Rome to negotiate what should become the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Rome Conference adopted the Statute on 17 July 1998. 120 States voted in favour of the Statute, seven against it, and 21 States abstained.
The necessary number of 60 ratifications of the Statute was reached surprisingly quickly and, on 1 July 2002, four years after its adoption, the Rome Statute entered into force. Thus, the ICC came into existence as an independent international institution. As of now, the Rome Statute has 105 States Parties.
The ICC has four organs: the Chambers are the principal judicial organ, consisting of the 18 Judges of the Court. The Chambers have three Divisions: the Pre-Trial Division, the Trial Division and the Appeals Division. The second organ, the Presidency, consists of three Judges, bearing the overall responsibility for the administration of the Court, its representation, etc. The Office of the Prosecutor, the third organ, is responsible for investigating and, eventually, prosecuting crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the Court. Finally, the Registry provides the administrative backbone of the institution.
The jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to the most heinous crimes that are of concern to the international community as a whole: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The definitions of these crimes are firmly established in customary and conventional international law. The temporal jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to crimes committed since the entry into force of the Rome Statute. Thus, there is no retroactivity of the Statute. The personal jurisdiction of the Court extends to persons who either are nationals of a State Party or who are alleged to have committed crimes on the territory of a State Party. Only when the Security Council of the United Nations, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, refers a situation to the ICC can the jurisdiction of the Court be extended to the territory of a State that is not party to the Rome Statute.
Investigations by the Prosecutor can be triggered by the referral of a situation by a State Party or by the Security Council. Thus far, the Prosecutor has received three referrals from States Parties, concerning the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, northern Uganda, and the Central African Republic. Furthermore, the Security Council has referred the situation in Darfur/Sudan to the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor has opened investigations into all situations with the exception of the Central African Republic. Thus far, the Court has issued arrest warrants in relation to suspects in the Uganda situation and in relation to a suspect in the Congo situation. The Congolese suspect, Mr. Lubanga Dyilo, was transferred to the Court in March 2006 and is awaiting trial. A confirmation hearing in relation to charges of recruitment and use of child soldiers has already been held. And on last 29 January 2007, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed most of the charges in relation to Mr. Lubanga Dyilo. Thus, the first trial before the ICC will start in the near future, which aptly demonstrates that the ICC has become a functioning and efficient international institution in very little time. On 17 October 2007, the Congolese authorities surrendered and transferred a second suspect, Mr Germain Katanga, a Congolese national and alleged commander of the Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri [Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri] (“FRPI”), to the International Criminal Court. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui becomes the third person to be surrendered to the jurisdiction of the Court. There are other individuals at large wanted by the ICC, including in relation to the ICC’s investigations in Darfur and Uganda.
The court faces various challenges as it conducts its investigations, such as the challenge of operating in situations of protracted instability, the need to secure the necessary support for its work from the international community at the political as well operational levels; logistical and administrative problems; and the challenge of implementing the legal framework of the Rome Statute where the governments concerned are engaged in conflict-resolution processes. For the purpose of this paper, I would like to focus on the last of those challenges.
In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that the crimes which tend to attract the attention of the Court will often have been committed during an arm conflict; the Court has, then, to consider the implication that any conflict resolution process may have on its approach to an going investigation.
In Uganda, the ICC is now directly confronting a question many believed was inevitable: will it continue prosecuting serious crimes if it becomes an obstacle to peace? Having issued indictments against the LRA commanders in October 2005, the Court still has none of them in custody. Although he initially referred the LRA cases to the ICC, Uganda's President Museveni then proposed amnesties for the commanders, instead to encourage the LRA to talk peace. The ICC warrants can’t simply be withdrawn, however, and options are now being explored for a compromise whereby the Ugandan Courts rather than the ICC would take up the baton and proceed with what may be watered-down charges.
The ICC has further headaches in the two other situations it is investigating. In Sudan, peace and justice tensions also loom and the Court confronts the challenge of how, without independent muscle, it is going to apprehend Darfur war crimes suspects (one of whom is in the government) when the Sudanese administration rejects the Court entirely.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ICC's first suspect has been transferred to The Hague, but the Court has been criticised for pursuing fairly lowly warlord while worse offenders now enjoy government positions.
Several factors help explain why debates surrounding the ICC are so heated. First, the ICC can only investigate crimes committed after July 2002, which means it is inevitably drawn into active conflict situations. Second, the fierce battle over the creation of the Court, only a few years old, means that those who were opposed to it from the outset are keen to see it fail while its supporters are anxious for it to “get results”. Expectations have often been unreasonably high, and the Court itself has fluctuated between modest and grand proclamations of what it can achieve. Third, the clustering of ICC cases in Africa invites inherently vexed issues of sovereignty and outsider intervention. Fourth, doubts over the effectiveness of international justice abounded even before the ICC was established. Debates framed as "peace vs justice" belie the complexity of the issues.
It is clear that peace is of vital importance and so, too, is justice. The international community settled the peace/justice debate in Rome Statute. The international community effectively decided that justice would always be a component of any conflict-resolution processes by holding to account all those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious crimes. Of course other actors, such as humanitarian agencies and security forces, are responsible for maintaining peace and providing relief to vulnerable civilian in situations of instability or armed conflict. The only issue which is open for discussion now is how justice and peace should work together.
This is not to say, however, that office of the Prosecutor does recognize that relations between the two imperatives will frequently be uneasy, and it is certain an issue with the court is grappling.
Having said that, it is important to discuss the role of the ICC. The mandate of the Court is to dispense justice for the victims of the crimes which fall within its jurisdictions. It is now clear, if there was ever any doubt, that victims are entitled to both justice and peace. What is important is that justice should be sought without undeserving ongoing peace processes. Consequently, The OTP seeks to find a solution which is compatible with the Rome Statute, local and traditional cultures and national laws so that accountability is ensured and justice and peace work effectively together.
It is often said that Court’s intervention is negative as it may potentially limit the ambit of peace negotiations: one of the instruments used by governments in the past for the conclusion of successful peace negotiations was the provision of immunity, often trough amnesty agreements, for persons accused of having committed serious crimes during the conflict. We have repeatedly said that such agreements are binding on the ICC, and indeed amnesties and impunity for those bearing the greatest responsibility for serious crimes are inconsistent with the Statute and have the effect of undermining the Rome system; in this context, it is frequently argued that ICC is an obstacle to peace. In particular, it is pointed out that is precisely those bearing the greatest degree of responsibility who will normally be key players in peace negotiations. Clearly, peace and justice are complementary in the sense that justice can deter abuses and can help make peace sustainable by addressing grievances non-violently.
The Prosecutor’s job is to prosecute and he should get on with it, with bulldog intensity. His task is to end impunity for the worst atrocity crimes: Article 53 gives him a certain discretion not to pursue matters if the “interests of justice” so require, but the interests of justice do not necessarily coincide with the interests of peace. Having the Prosecutor make the determination as to when and how to weigh the demands of conflict resolution puts him in an impossible situation. So he has to get on with justice. If the judgement has to be made, on occasion, that the interests of peace should override those of justice, then that should be for the Security Council to decide, not the ICC, and the pressure and weight of expectations should be taken off the Prosecutor’s shoulders in this respect.
a) By ensuring that the most responsible people are held individually responsible for the atrocities they committed, the ICC can prevent entire groups-nationals, ethnic or religious groups-from being stigmatized by the reset of society. As such, the ICC can ensure that individual do not resort to acts of revenge in their search for justice.
b) By neutralizing the major criminals, those criminals are being precluded from sustaining a climate of violence and hatred which will inevitably lead to future conflicts.
c) Many of those victimized or otherwise affected by serious crimes have repeatedly testified that the only proper response to the most serious human rights abuses is the institution of criminal proceedings before a court of law duly authorized to established judicial facts, render judgments, and-were called for to punish the most responsible perpetrators.
d) Victims have also consistently stated a climate of confidence may be difficult to establish if the main violators of their fundamental human rights are not brought to justice. By offering victims an objective, solemn and public forum, the ICC offers a solid basis on which a new society can take shape.
In addition, the intervention of the Court presents new opportunities that can be maximized in the context of negotiations.
First, the intervention of the Court contributes to focusing the attention of word on the horrific crimes committed; the Court has played a key role in focusing the attention on tragedy in Northern Uganda. It has become clear to those observing the events in Uganda that, although it seems that the conflict has all but disappeared from international awareness, serous crimes continue to be committed on a large scale.
Second, the Court can help reduce political or economic support for those perpetrate serious crimes. It is a known fact that weapons and other resources are supplied to groups talking part in conflicts by third parties. By exposing the scale and nature of crimes whose commission is facilitated by these weapons and resources, the Court intervention can help to reduce support for those who commit the crimes.
Third, the issuing of arrest warrants, or indeed the threat of the Court’s intervention, can help to bring belligerents to the negotiating table. In Uganda, for instance, as result of warrants issued against the LRA’s senior commanders, the LRA felt able to take part in the peace process. That being said, warrants are not mere tools to bring parties to the negotiation table; there must be follow-through in Uganda and we would want the solution agreed upon, in the end, to be compatible with the Rome Statute.
Fourth, and, I addition to drawing certain parties to the peace process, the ICC can help to marginalize those who bear the greatest responsibility for the serous crimes and put them out of negotiation frame.
This happened, for instance, in the case of UN tribunal set up to deal with persons suspected of committing war crimes and others serious crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Two of individuals against who warrants were issued by ICTY (general Mladic and Karadzic) were effectively marginalized during the peace process which resulted in the Dayton peace accords.
Consequently, the Court’s involvement may, in some circumstances, eliminate criminals from the peace process which, in turn, can assist the legitimacy of the negotiations themselves. It is possible, considering the issues from that perspective, that political isolation of such individuals has the potential to pay substantial dividends for peace.
Accepting that some may feel that ICC’ intervention may have both positive and negative consequences, the challenge to try to take advantage of the opportunities crated by the Rome system, because what we have now is legal regime which most of international community has accepted. As indicated earlier, the Rome Statute establish a new framework where victims are entitled to both justice and where impunity is no longer an acceptable option. The Court will apply the law, but it depends on other partners to contribute their efforts to holistic approach to justice and to conflict resolution.
Modede citation : Jean-Baptiste HARELIMANA, « Justice versus peace: a dilemma for the International Criminal Court », MULTIPOL - Réseau d'analyse et d'information sur l'actualité internationale, 25 février 2008.
The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
The purported tension between peace and justice is well-known, and it continues to be real and important. This paper will focus upon challenges and opportunities for pursuing “holistic” peace and justice simultaneously.
How to implement the Rome Statute where conflict resolution initiative are ongoing or are in the process of implementation? What happens - and what should happen - when efforts to prosecute perpetrators of mass atrocities coincide with a peace process? What is the best approach when the price of a peace deal seems to be a degree of impunity for those most responsible for such abuses?
The Rome Statute’s entry into force in July 2002 represented the culmination of massive international effort to address impunity. Its central features are its permanence and international nature, bringing distinct advantages over some domestic transitional processes and some ad hoc processes.
The international community including, notably, African countries, played a significant role in the negotiation of a compressive and robust treaty which lays the foundations for an effective international strategy for the prosecution of the most serious crimes of international concern, namely genocide, war crime and crime against humanity, and attainment of justice for the victims of those crimes. Very significantly, the establishment of the ICC (and the creation of ad hoc tribunals and special courts before it) also signaled the conviction of the international community that the justice is an intrinsic component of durable peace.
I. History of the ICC
The idea of a permanent international criminal court dates back to the war crimes trials of the major war criminals of the Axis powers after World War II. The lesson of Nuremberg and Tokyo was simple: in order to avoid genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, those responsible for such crimes must be brought to justice. Thus, in the 1950s, a Statute of an international criminal Court and a Code of crimes against mankind were drafted and discussed within the framework of the United Nations. The Cold War, however, brought this development to a temporary halt.
With the end of the Cold War, new development was possible. The gruesome conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda convinced the international community that the time for international criminal justice was ripe. The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) also paved the ground for a more ambitious goal: the establishment of a permanent ICC. In the summer of 1998, representatives of more than 160 States and of more than 250 non-governmental organizations met in Rome to negotiate what should become the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Rome Conference adopted the Statute on 17 July 1998. 120 States voted in favour of the Statute, seven against it, and 21 States abstained.
The necessary number of 60 ratifications of the Statute was reached surprisingly quickly and, on 1 July 2002, four years after its adoption, the Rome Statute entered into force. Thus, the ICC came into existence as an independent international institution. As of now, the Rome Statute has 105 States Parties.
The ICC has four organs: the Chambers are the principal judicial organ, consisting of the 18 Judges of the Court. The Chambers have three Divisions: the Pre-Trial Division, the Trial Division and the Appeals Division. The second organ, the Presidency, consists of three Judges, bearing the overall responsibility for the administration of the Court, its representation, etc. The Office of the Prosecutor, the third organ, is responsible for investigating and, eventually, prosecuting crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the Court. Finally, the Registry provides the administrative backbone of the institution.
II. Exercise of jurisdiction of the ICC
The jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to the most heinous crimes that are of concern to the international community as a whole: genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The definitions of these crimes are firmly established in customary and conventional international law. The temporal jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to crimes committed since the entry into force of the Rome Statute. Thus, there is no retroactivity of the Statute. The personal jurisdiction of the Court extends to persons who either are nationals of a State Party or who are alleged to have committed crimes on the territory of a State Party. Only when the Security Council of the United Nations, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, refers a situation to the ICC can the jurisdiction of the Court be extended to the territory of a State that is not party to the Rome Statute.
Investigations by the Prosecutor can be triggered by the referral of a situation by a State Party or by the Security Council. Thus far, the Prosecutor has received three referrals from States Parties, concerning the situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, northern Uganda, and the Central African Republic. Furthermore, the Security Council has referred the situation in Darfur/Sudan to the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor has opened investigations into all situations with the exception of the Central African Republic. Thus far, the Court has issued arrest warrants in relation to suspects in the Uganda situation and in relation to a suspect in the Congo situation. The Congolese suspect, Mr. Lubanga Dyilo, was transferred to the Court in March 2006 and is awaiting trial. A confirmation hearing in relation to charges of recruitment and use of child soldiers has already been held. And on last 29 January 2007, the Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed most of the charges in relation to Mr. Lubanga Dyilo. Thus, the first trial before the ICC will start in the near future, which aptly demonstrates that the ICC has become a functioning and efficient international institution in very little time. On 17 October 2007, the Congolese authorities surrendered and transferred a second suspect, Mr Germain Katanga, a Congolese national and alleged commander of the Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri [Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri] (“FRPI”), to the International Criminal Court. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui becomes the third person to be surrendered to the jurisdiction of the Court. There are other individuals at large wanted by the ICC, including in relation to the ICC’s investigations in Darfur and Uganda.
III. Challenges faced by the
international criminal Court
The court faces various challenges as it conducts its investigations, such as the challenge of operating in situations of protracted instability, the need to secure the necessary support for its work from the international community at the political as well operational levels; logistical and administrative problems; and the challenge of implementing the legal framework of the Rome Statute where the governments concerned are engaged in conflict-resolution processes. For the purpose of this paper, I would like to focus on the last of those challenges.
In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that the crimes which tend to attract the attention of the Court will often have been committed during an arm conflict; the Court has, then, to consider the implication that any conflict resolution process may have on its approach to an going investigation.
In Uganda, the ICC is now directly confronting a question many believed was inevitable: will it continue prosecuting serious crimes if it becomes an obstacle to peace? Having issued indictments against the LRA commanders in October 2005, the Court still has none of them in custody. Although he initially referred the LRA cases to the ICC, Uganda's President Museveni then proposed amnesties for the commanders, instead to encourage the LRA to talk peace. The ICC warrants can’t simply be withdrawn, however, and options are now being explored for a compromise whereby the Ugandan Courts rather than the ICC would take up the baton and proceed with what may be watered-down charges.
The ICC has further headaches in the two other situations it is investigating. In Sudan, peace and justice tensions also loom and the Court confronts the challenge of how, without independent muscle, it is going to apprehend Darfur war crimes suspects (one of whom is in the government) when the Sudanese administration rejects the Court entirely.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the ICC's first suspect has been transferred to The Hague, but the Court has been criticised for pursuing fairly lowly warlord while worse offenders now enjoy government positions.
Several factors help explain why debates surrounding the ICC are so heated. First, the ICC can only investigate crimes committed after July 2002, which means it is inevitably drawn into active conflict situations. Second, the fierce battle over the creation of the Court, only a few years old, means that those who were opposed to it from the outset are keen to see it fail while its supporters are anxious for it to “get results”. Expectations have often been unreasonably high, and the Court itself has fluctuated between modest and grand proclamations of what it can achieve. Third, the clustering of ICC cases in Africa invites inherently vexed issues of sovereignty and outsider intervention. Fourth, doubts over the effectiveness of international justice abounded even before the ICC was established. Debates framed as "peace vs justice" belie the complexity of the issues.
It is clear that peace is of vital importance and so, too, is justice. The international community settled the peace/justice debate in Rome Statute. The international community effectively decided that justice would always be a component of any conflict-resolution processes by holding to account all those who bear the greatest responsibility for serious crimes. Of course other actors, such as humanitarian agencies and security forces, are responsible for maintaining peace and providing relief to vulnerable civilian in situations of instability or armed conflict. The only issue which is open for discussion now is how justice and peace should work together.
This is not to say, however, that office of the Prosecutor does recognize that relations between the two imperatives will frequently be uneasy, and it is certain an issue with the court is grappling.
Having said that, it is important to discuss the role of the ICC. The mandate of the Court is to dispense justice for the victims of the crimes which fall within its jurisdictions. It is now clear, if there was ever any doubt, that victims are entitled to both justice and peace. What is important is that justice should be sought without undeserving ongoing peace processes. Consequently, The OTP seeks to find a solution which is compatible with the Rome Statute, local and traditional cultures and national laws so that accountability is ensured and justice and peace work effectively together.
It is often said that Court’s intervention is negative as it may potentially limit the ambit of peace negotiations: one of the instruments used by governments in the past for the conclusion of successful peace negotiations was the provision of immunity, often trough amnesty agreements, for persons accused of having committed serious crimes during the conflict. We have repeatedly said that such agreements are binding on the ICC, and indeed amnesties and impunity for those bearing the greatest responsibility for serious crimes are inconsistent with the Statute and have the effect of undermining the Rome system; in this context, it is frequently argued that ICC is an obstacle to peace. In particular, it is pointed out that is precisely those bearing the greatest degree of responsibility who will normally be key players in peace negotiations. Clearly, peace and justice are complementary in the sense that justice can deter abuses and can help make peace sustainable by addressing grievances non-violently.
The Prosecutor’s job is to prosecute and he should get on with it, with bulldog intensity. His task is to end impunity for the worst atrocity crimes: Article 53 gives him a certain discretion not to pursue matters if the “interests of justice” so require, but the interests of justice do not necessarily coincide with the interests of peace. Having the Prosecutor make the determination as to when and how to weigh the demands of conflict resolution puts him in an impossible situation. So he has to get on with justice. If the judgement has to be made, on occasion, that the interests of peace should override those of justice, then that should be for the Security Council to decide, not the ICC, and the pressure and weight of expectations should be taken off the Prosecutor’s shoulders in this respect.
IV.
Conditions which are conductive to reconciliation and, ultimately, justice
a) By ensuring that the most responsible people are held individually responsible for the atrocities they committed, the ICC can prevent entire groups-nationals, ethnic or religious groups-from being stigmatized by the reset of society. As such, the ICC can ensure that individual do not resort to acts of revenge in their search for justice.
b) By neutralizing the major criminals, those criminals are being precluded from sustaining a climate of violence and hatred which will inevitably lead to future conflicts.
c) Many of those victimized or otherwise affected by serious crimes have repeatedly testified that the only proper response to the most serious human rights abuses is the institution of criminal proceedings before a court of law duly authorized to established judicial facts, render judgments, and-were called for to punish the most responsible perpetrators.
d) Victims have also consistently stated a climate of confidence may be difficult to establish if the main violators of their fundamental human rights are not brought to justice. By offering victims an objective, solemn and public forum, the ICC offers a solid basis on which a new society can take shape.
In addition, the intervention of the Court presents new opportunities that can be maximized in the context of negotiations.
First, the intervention of the Court contributes to focusing the attention of word on the horrific crimes committed; the Court has played a key role in focusing the attention on tragedy in Northern Uganda. It has become clear to those observing the events in Uganda that, although it seems that the conflict has all but disappeared from international awareness, serous crimes continue to be committed on a large scale.
Second, the Court can help reduce political or economic support for those perpetrate serious crimes. It is a known fact that weapons and other resources are supplied to groups talking part in conflicts by third parties. By exposing the scale and nature of crimes whose commission is facilitated by these weapons and resources, the Court intervention can help to reduce support for those who commit the crimes.
Third, the issuing of arrest warrants, or indeed the threat of the Court’s intervention, can help to bring belligerents to the negotiating table. In Uganda, for instance, as result of warrants issued against the LRA’s senior commanders, the LRA felt able to take part in the peace process. That being said, warrants are not mere tools to bring parties to the negotiation table; there must be follow-through in Uganda and we would want the solution agreed upon, in the end, to be compatible with the Rome Statute.
Fourth, and, I addition to drawing certain parties to the peace process, the ICC can help to marginalize those who bear the greatest responsibility for the serous crimes and put them out of negotiation frame.
This happened, for instance, in the case of UN tribunal set up to deal with persons suspected of committing war crimes and others serious crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Two of individuals against who warrants were issued by ICTY (general Mladic and Karadzic) were effectively marginalized during the peace process which resulted in the Dayton peace accords.
Consequently, the Court’s involvement may, in some circumstances, eliminate criminals from the peace process which, in turn, can assist the legitimacy of the negotiations themselves. It is possible, considering the issues from that perspective, that political isolation of such individuals has the potential to pay substantial dividends for peace.
Conclusion
Accepting that some may feel that ICC’ intervention may have both positive and negative consequences, the challenge to try to take advantage of the opportunities crated by the Rome system, because what we have now is legal regime which most of international community has accepted. As indicated earlier, the Rome Statute establish a new framework where victims are entitled to both justice and where impunity is no longer an acceptable option. The Court will apply the law, but it depends on other partners to contribute their efforts to holistic approach to justice and to conflict resolution.
Modede citation : Jean-Baptiste HARELIMANA, « Justice versus peace: a dilemma for the International Criminal Court », MULTIPOL - Réseau d'analyse et d'information sur l'actualité internationale, 25 février 2008.
The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
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